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ARTICLES
LEAVING THE DOOR AJAR: THE SUPREME COURT AND
ASSISTED SUICIDE
Melvin L Urofsky*
"I had thought it self-evident that all men were endowed by
their Creator with liberty as one of the cardinal unalienable
rights. It is that basic freedom which the Due Process
Clause protects, rather than the particular rights or privi-
leges conferred by specific laws or regulations."
-John Paul Stevens'
In June, 1997, the Supreme Court ruled that a constitutional
right to assisted suicide exists in neither the Due Process nor
the Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.2
But while a federal right does not exist, the Court made it
quite clear that the states had ample leeway in which to fash-
ion law on this issue; moreover, the concurring opinions of five
Justices strongly implied that, should the states enact legisla-
tion that would severely limit end-of-life choices, the Supreme
Court would revisit the issue. Far from slamming the door shut
on assisted suicide, the Court left it more than a little ajar.
* Professor of History and Public Policy, Virginia Commonwealth University; Ad-
junct Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. A.B., 1961, Ph.D.,
1968, Columbia University; J.D., 1983, University of Virginia. I wish to thank the fol-
lowing for commenting on the manuscript: John Paul Jones and Michael A. Wolf of
the University of Richmond School of Law; Jill Norgren of CUNY; Philippa Strum of
the Woodrow Wilson Center; and Philip E. Urofsky of the Justice Department.
1. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 230 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 117 S.
Ct. 2293 (1997).
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Part I of this article looks at the context in which the assist-
ed suicide debate has been taking place; namely, the growing
acceptance both in American law and society of an individual
right to die, a right grounded both in common law and in the
Constitution. Part II examines the debate over assisted suicide.
Parts III and IV analyze the lower court cases in Washington
and New York, while Part V examines the Supreme Court
decisions and their impact on the current debate. Part VI ven-
tures some conclusions on the cases and the subject.
I
Since the questions of assisted suicide and of a right to die
have been in the news so much in recent years, it is easy to
forget that the issue barely existed either in the public con-
sciousness or in much of the legal community until 1976. In
that year, the Supreme Court of New Jersey decided In re
Quinlan,3 and triggered a growing public awareness of and
debate over what choices an individual should have at the end
of life.
A
In the early evening of April 15, 1975, Karen Ann Quinlan, a
vivacious, attractive twenty-one year old, was rushed to the
hospital. Apparently, she had been drinking and took some
drugs. Then she stopped breathing. Friends called a rescue
squad, and the paramedics were able to revive the woman's
breathing. During the several minutes when she had not been
breathing, however, she had suffered anoxia, in which the brain
receives an insufficient amount of oxygen. At the Catholic New-
ton Memorial Hospital, doctors placed the young woman on a
respirator and waited for her to recover consciousness. She
never did. Three months later, Karen Ann's parents signed a
release to have the doctors take their daughter off life-support,
but the hospital and the doctors refused. The doctors held out
no hope for recovery, but, at the same time, feared they would
incur liability in a wrongful death suit. Joseph Quinlan then
went to court to have himself appointed guardian of his daugh-
3. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976). The fuji story of the Quinlan case is in JOSEPH
QUINLAN & JULIA QUINLAN, WITH PHYLLIS BATTELLE, KAREN ANN: THE QUINLANS
TELL THEIR STORY (1977).
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ter and to secure authority to cease all heroic measures to keep
her alive.
What had hitherto been a private family trauma now hit the
front pages of the nation's newspapers. At the trial, a number
of expert witnesses testified in support of the parents' request.
Dr. Julius Korein, a neurologist, explained what he called "judi-
cious neglect" in which a doctor would say: "Don't treat this
patient anymore, . . . it does not serve either the patient, the
family, or society in any meaningful way to continue treatment
with this patient."4
The trial court refused to allow termination of treatment
because Karen Ann did not meet the standard for brain death,
namely, a flat electroencephalogram (EEG).5 "There is a duty
to continue the life-assisting apparatus," Judge Robert Muir
wrote.6 "There is no constitutional right to die that can be as-
serted by a parent for his incompetent adult child."' The Su-
preme Court of New Jersey reversed the trial judge and or-
dered that the respirator could be removed without any legal or
civil liability attaching to the hospital or the medical staff.8
The doctors removed the respirator, but the nuns at the hos-
pital, anticipating the decision, already had begun to wean their
patient from the machine. When the doctors removed the appa-
ratus, Karen Ann was able to breathe on her own. Much to the
anguish of her family, she lived on in a persistent vegetative
state, never regaining consciousness. She finally died in July,
1985.
The problems raised in the Quinlan case were not new to the
medical profession or to families that had to face the problem
of caring for a terminally ill person. Moreover, advances in
medical care now make it possible to keep people alive lon-
ger-people like Karen Ann Quinlan who would have died from
their illness or injury had it occurred only a few years earlier.
The questions of whether a terminally ill person ought to be
allowed to die without medical intervention, whether passive or
4. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 657.
5. See In re Quinlan, 348 A.2d 801, 811 (1975).
6. Id. at 819.
7. Id. at 822.
8. See Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 671-72.
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active euthanasia should be allowed, or whether a person
should be allowed, even assisted, to commit suicide involve
moral questions that are beyond the scope of this article.'
Here, we are concerned only with the legal questions.
B
While the actual form of the question in Quinlan may have
been novel, the underlying issue, namely, the right to resist an
unwanted touching, had been familiar to common law judges
for many years. Courts have construed this right to mean that
unauthorized medical treatment constitutes a battery, so that a
competent person almost always may refuse treatment. An
Illinois court declared in 1905,
[u]nder a free government, . . . the free citizen's first and
greatest right, which underlies all others-the right to the
inviolability of his person . . . is the subject of universal
acquiescence, and this right necessarily forbids a physician
or surgeon ... to violate, without permission, the bodily
integrity of his patient by... operating upon him without
his consent or knowledge. 10
In the same year, in a Minnesota case still studied by first-year
law students, a court ruled that a doctor could not perform, in
the absence of an emergency, a procedure unauthorized by the
patient.1 "If the operation was performed without plaintiffs
consent, and the circumstances were not such as to justify its
performance without, it was wrongful; and if it was wrongful, it
was unlawful." 2 Benjamin Cardozo, considered by many to be
the finest common law jurist of this century, declared that
"[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a
right to determine what shall be done with his own body." 3
9. The literature on this subject is vast, and growing ever larger. A brief sum-
mary of the views of major religions can be found in MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LETTING
GO: DEATH, DYING AND THE LAW ch. 1 (1993), which refers to some of the more im-
portant works on this topic.
10. Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 14 (Minn. 1905) (quoting Pratt v. Davis, 37
CHIcAGo LEGAL NEWS 213 (1905)). The earliest reported case taking this view is the
English case of Slater v. Baker & Stapleton, 95 Eng. Rep. 860 (KB. 1767).
11. See Mohr, 104 N.W. at 16.
12. Id.
13. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
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The common law spoke less to the idea of a right to die than
to the question of individual autonomy, the control a person has
over his or her body against any unwanted action, be it a bru-
tal assault or a medical procedure. A person has a right to
consent to treatment, and thus a corollary right to refuse treat-
ment,4 even if refusal may lead to death. 5 Moreover, this
right is personal, and the decision need not conform to what a
majority of society thinks a person ought to do. Warren Burger,
while still an appeals judge, pointed out that it is the individu-
al and not society who should determine what is best for that
individual:
Mr. Justice Brandeis, whose views have inspired much of
the "right to be let alone" philosophy, said: "The makers of
our Constitution... sought to protect Americans in their
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions, and their sensations.
They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be
let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized man." Nothing in this utterance
suggests that Justice Brandeis thought an individual pos-
sessed these rights only as to sensible beliefs, valid
thoughts, reasonable emotions, or well-founded sensations. I
suggest he intended to include a great many foolish, unrea-
sonable, and even absurd ideas which do not conform.'
By the time the New Jersey court heard the Quinlan appeal,
it also had some constitutional law to rely upon, namely the
right to privacy which was first enunciated by the United
States Supreme Court in the landmark case of Griswold v.
Connecticut7 and later expanded upon in the Court's abortion
14. The law demands informed consent, which means that a person electing ei-
ther to accept or to forego treatment must be mentally competent, act voluntarily,
and have sufficient information upon which to base the decision.
15. Much of the litigation in this area involves Jehovah's Witnesses who object to
blood transfusions on religious grounds. In general, courts have permitted adults to
decline treatment. See, e.g., St. Mary's Hosp. v. Ramsey, 465 So.2d 666 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1958). Courts, however, often intervene when children's lives are involved. See
Kenneth J. Rampino, Annotation, Power of Court or Other Public Agency to Order
Medical Treatment Over Parental Religious Objections for Child Whose Life is Not
Immediately Endangered, 52 A.L.R.3d 1118 (1974).
16. In re President of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1964)
(Burger, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
17. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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ruling in Roe v. Wade.'" New Jersey Chief Justice Richard J.
Hughes drew on these two cases to conclude that the federal
Constitution guarantees certain areas of privacy, and "presum-
ably this right is broad enough to encompass a patient's deci-
sion to decline medical treatment under certain circumstanc-
es."19
In the years following Quinlan, state courts expanded the
notion that individual autonomy included a right to decline
treatment, even if it would lead to death. Since most states had
laws against suicide, attempted suicide or assisting suicide,
judges had to come up with a rationale that distinguished be-
tween suicide and the termination of medical treatment that
would lead to death. In Quinlan, the court argued that the real
cause of death would not be the termination of life-sustaining
treatment, but the underlying illness." The disease, or in Ka-
ren Ann Quinlan's case, the condition, would be the cause of
death.2' Other courts have reasoned that there can be neither
a homicide nor a suicide if the patient exercises his or her right
to forego treatment. This is the underlying philosophy of the
Uniform Rights of the Terminally ll Act, namely, that "[d]eath
resulting from the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment pursuant to a declaration and in accordance with
this [Act] does not constitute, for any purpose, a suicide or a
homicide."22 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, state courts ex-
panded what many people have come to call a right to die by
upholding the claims of patients that they had a right to stop
treatmentY In addition, state courts also recognized the use of
living wills, by which a competent person could direct what
medical treatment he or she wanted or did not want in the
future.'4
18. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
19. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (N.J. 1976).
20. See id.
21. See id. at 670.
22. UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT § 10(a), 98 U.L.A. 620 (1987).
23. See, e.g., Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So.2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Superintendent of
Belchertown State Hosp. v. Saikewicz, 387 N.E.2d 1145 (Mass. 1977); In re
Dinnerstein, 380 N.E.2d 134 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978); Eichner v. Dillon, 426 N.Y.S.2d
517 (1980).
24. See infra Part C.
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C
Living wills or advance directives' allow a person to make
contingency plans. Although courts have established a right for
a competent person to make decisions about cessation of treat-
ment, what if a person is in an automobile accident and is
brought to a hospital in a comatose condition? Without instruc-
tions to the contrary, the hospital automatically will put that
patient on life-support. Advance directives, which provide a
durable power of attorney, allow a second person, a child, a
spouse or attorney, to say to the hospital, "the patient has
clearly indicated that she does not want heroic measures taken
in such circumstances, and that she is not to be put on life-
support."
An Illinois attorney, Luis Kutner, is given credit for propos-
ing a formal advance directive in 1969,2" although the notion
did not catch on immediately. Following Quinlan, however, the
idea rapidly expanded, and, at present, all fifty states and the
District of Columbia have adopted some form of advance direc-
tive statute. Forty-eight states also have legislation providing
for a health care proxy through a durable power of attorney,
and twenty-five have enacted some form of surrogate decision
making statute."
Although courts have consistently upheld the validity of these
state statutes," not all patients had living wills, and even
when they did, not all doctors and hospitals were willing to
abide by these instructions.29 To ensure the greatest possible
autonomy for patients, Congress, in October, 1990, passed the
25. Although the terms "advance directive" and "living will" are often used inter-
changeably, they are not the same. A living will is one form of advance directive, al-
though it is popularly used in reference to all kinds.
26. See Luis Kutner, Due Process of Euthanasia: The Living Will, A Proposal, 44
IN]. L.J. 539 (1969).
27. For evaluations of the different state laws, see Christopher J. Condie, Com-
parison of the Living Will Statutes of the Fifty States, 14 J. CONTEMP. LAW 105
(1988), and Shari Lobe, The Will to Die: Survey of State Living Will Legislation and
Case Law, 9 PROB. L.J. 47 (1989). For the Virginia law, see VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-
2981-2993 (Michie 1994), which codifies the Health Care Decisions Act.
28. See, e.g., John F. Kennedy Mem'l Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So.2d 921 (Fla.
1984); In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419 (N.J. 1987); Saunders v. State, 492 N.Y.S.2d 510
(1985).
29. For one particularly onerous example, see Englebert L. Schucking, Death at a
New York Hospital, LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE, Dec. 1985, at 261.
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Patient Self-Determination Act.3 ' The law, which went into
effect in December, 1991, requires all hospitals receiving Medi-
care or Medicaid funds to provide entering patients written
information about their rights under state law to accept or
refuse medical treatment, as well as their right to formulate
advance directives and durable powers of attorney. The hospi-
tals are obliged to record in each patient's records whether or
not an advance directive has been provided, and to train their
staffs on the subject."'
The law appears to have an effect in making patients aware
of their rights, and doctors and hospitals are finding themselves
in court when they ignore advance directives. In Michigan, a
jury awarded Brenda Young and her family $16.5 million in a
suit against Genesys St. Joseph Hospital for ignoring Ms.
Young's directions that she not be put on a ventilator.2 After
she suffered another in a series of seizures, the hospital and
attending doctors put her on life-support, saving her life, but
also leaving her in the kind of existence she had feared and
had wanted to avoid."3 Ms. Young now needs round-the-clock
attendance, is mentally incompetent, has little control over her
bodily functions, and must be tied to the bed to prevent her
from hurting herself.34 The Michigan case is seen as part of a
trend to force health care providers, accustomed to doing what
they consider in the best interests of the patient or their own
religious beliefs, to pay attention to patient's wishes. According
to Richard Wade, a spokesperson for the American Hospital
Association, "we are human beings whose training and back-
ground are in saving lives. So it's going to take us awhile to
learn to deal with these end-of-life issues."35
The federal law did not affect the rights of states to establish
standards in their advance directive laws, and not all states
follow the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, which is
30. Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990) (codified as 42 U.S.C. §§
1395cc(f)(i), 1396a(a)).
31. See id.
32. See Tamar Lewin, Suits Accuse Medical Community of Ignoring Right to Die
Orders, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1996, at Al.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. Id.
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generally liberal in its provisions for proving the wishes of
individuals. Missouri and a few other states had a higher stan-
dard of evidence, and that led to the first case before the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court testing whether the Constitution
protected the right to die.
D
On the night of January 11, 1983, coming home from her job
on the night shift at a cheese factory, twenty-five-year-old Nan-
cy Beth Cruzan lost control of her old Nash Rambler on an icy
road near the small town of Carthage, Missouri.3 6 The car slid
off the road and flipped over, throwing her some thirty-five feet
out of the car and facedown into a ditch. Emergency help came
promptly, but not soon enough. The rescue squad resuscitated
Nancy Cruzan, but her brain had been deprived of oxygen too
long. Like Karen Ann Quinlan, Cruzan never regained con-
sciousness and sank into a persistent vegetative state, seeming-
ly awake, but totally unaware of her surroundings. Unlike
Quinlan, Cruzan could breathe on her own, but for seven years
she lay curled in a fetal position at the Missouri Rehabilitation
Center in Mount Vernon. She had been kept alive by a tube
inserted into her stomach that provided nutrients and water.
She had been a healthy person before the accident, and her
doctors said that her heart and lungs might function for anoth-
er thirty years. Her parents finally gave up hope that she
would recover, and went to court to have the feeding tube re-
moved."
The Cruzans went into the local probate court in their home-
town of Carthage. If Nancy had been a minor, her parents
would have had the authority to act on their own. Because
Nancy was not a minor, Judge Robert E. Teel appointed a
guardian, Thad C. McCanse, to represent her interests.
McCanse agreed with the parents, and Judge Teel granted the
Cruzans' request. But William L. Webster, acting under his
36. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 410-11 (Mo. 1988).
37. See id. at 410. Although the American Medical Association and many medical
ethicists consider artificial feeding and hydration a medical treatment that, like a
respirator, could be withdrawn from a terminally ill patient, the idea horrified many
people. Food and water, even through a tube, are the basic necessities of life and
evoke a far more emotional response than do respirators.
1998] 321
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:313
authority as Missouri Attorney General, decided to appeal the
case and claimed that, under Missouri law, there had to be
clear and convincing evidence that Nancy Cruzan had earlier
indicated that she would want all medical assistance terminat-
ed in such circumstances. Although her parents had said this
was her wish, Webster claimed they had not met the burden of
proof required under state law. The state, in its role as special
guardian of incompetent persons, placed a high value on life. 8
Webster did not dispute that people had the right to stop treat-
ment; he argued, however, that the state had an equally com-
pelling right to insist that there be clear evidence of the
patient's wishes. The Missouri Supreme Court, by a 4-3 vote,
reversed Judge Teel and agreed with the attorney general. 9
The Cruzans appealed to the Supreme Court, which accepted
the case and held oral argument in December, 1989.
In an extremely cautious opinion written by Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist, the majority ruled that as part of per-
sonal autonomy, there was indeed a constitutionally protected
right to die.4° The opinion emphasized that this right did not
derive from any constitutional guarantee of privacy (which had
been utilized by the New Jersey court in Quinlan), but from
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 'The princi-
ple that a competent person has a constitutionally protected
liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be
inferred from our prior decisions."41 The key word is "compe-
tent," and the Court noted that this is an area normally as-
signed to state jurisdiction, not federal law. Although only two
other states, New York and Maine, required the same high
level of proof that Missouri did, under a federal system, a
state's powerful interest in protecting life gives it the authority
to establish such a test. Missouri law, the Chief Justice con-
38. See id. 760 S.W.2d at 419.
39. See id. at 426-27.
40. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
41. Id. at 278. The prior decisions included: Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S.
11 (1905), in which the Court upheld a state's interest in preventing disease over the
individual's liberty interest in refusing a smallpox vaccination; Washington v. Harper,
494 U.S. 210 (1990), administering antipsychotic medication to a prisoner, Parham v.
J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979), involuntary confinement of a child for medical treatment;
and reference to various Fourth Amendment cases involving seizure and body search-
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cluded, did not unduly burden the individual's constitutionally
protected right to autonomy.42
Perhaps the element of the majority opinion most disturbing
to civil libertarians was the discussion of balancing an individ-
ual's liberty interest against countervailing state concerns. De-
claring that a liberty interest exists merely begins the judicial
inquiry; courts must then determine whether the liberty inter-
est outweighs the claims of the state. Chief Justice Rehnquist
seemed to indicate that the courts should use little more than a
rational basis test, the lowest standard of constitutional review,
in weighing individual liberty interests against state concerns
in this area. Thus, if a state could show a rational basis for de-
priving an individual of his or her liberty interest, such as
administrative convenience, the courts could, under Cruzan,
uphold the state's claim. Moreover, the burden of proof rests on
the family of an incompetent person to "prove" that the patient,
if competent and able to make his or her wishes known, would
want medical treatment or artificial feeding terminated. In
states with a high evidentiary standard, this might be a diffi-
cult or even impossible demand.
Missouri, of course, wanted a high standard, not in order
that Nancy Cruzan should live as a vegetable, but that there be
clear and convincing evidence that she would have indeed cho-
sen death in these circumstances. Missouri did not act in a
heartless manner, but in fact carried on a long and honorable
tradition, that of the state legitimately seeking to protect the
lives of its citizens, even the life of a person in a persistent
vegetative state. In January, 1990, after the case had been ar-
gued in the Supreme Court, but before a decision had been
handed down, Attorney General William L. Webster proposed
legislation to Missouri lawmakers to establish clearer guidelines
on who would be able to make decisions in cases like Nancy
Cruzan's, and what criteria should govern the decisions.4"
Both Justices Antonin Scalia and Sandra Day O'Connor filed
concurring opinions. Justice Scalia, while declaring his sympa-
thy for the Cruzans, nonetheless believed that the Constitution
42. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281-82.
43. See Guidelines on Dying Argued by Both Sides of Case in Missouri, N.Y.
TnmEs, Jan. 14, 1990, at A18.
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had nothing to say in this matter, that laws governing end-of-
life choices properly belonged in the jurisdiction of the states.
He wrote:
I would have preferred that we announce, clearly and
promptly, that the federal courts have no business in this
field; that American law has always accorded the State the
power to prevent, by force if necessary, suicide-including
suicide by refusing to take appropriate measures necessary
to preserve one's life; that the point at which life becomes
"worthless," and the point at which the means necessary to
preserve it become "extraordinary" or "inappropriate," are
neither set forth in the Constitution nor known to the nine
Justices of this Court any better than they are known to
nine people picked at random from the Kansas City tele-
phone directory. ....
The assumptions of Justice O'Connor's concurrence run in
just the opposite direction from those of Justice Scalia. Where
he would have denied any constitutional factor in end-of-life
decisions, Justice O'Connor believed that the Constitution did,
in fact, provide a "protected liberty interest in refusing unwant-
ed medical treatment" and "that the refusal of artificially deliv-
ered food and water is encompassed within that liberty inter-
est."45 Justice O'Connor wanted to emphasize the narrowness
of the majority opinion-what it said and what it did not say.
The decision, she wrote, "does not preclude a future determina-
tion that the Constitution requires the States to implement the
decisions of a patient's duly appointed surrogate. Nor does it
prevent States from developing other approaches for protecting
an incompetent individual's liberty interest in refusing medical
treatment."46 "Today," she concluded, "we decide only that one
State's practice does not violate the Constitution," and that
procedures for safeguarding incompetents are left, at least for
the moment, in the hands of the states.4"
Justice William Brennan's minority opinion, joined by
Justices Marshall and Blackmun, reads as if it may have origi-
44. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 293 (Scalia, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 287 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
46. Id. at 292.
47. Id.
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nally been drafted as a majority opinion, with Justice O'Connor
holding the decisive fifth vote. (Justice John Paul Stevens also
dissented). The four Justices in the minority would have struck
the balance more in favor of the individual rather than the
state. The Missouri rule, Justice Brennan charged, transforms
human beings into "passive prisoner[s] of medical technolo-
gy, " 48 and, in essence, gives the final power to decide to the
state and not to the individual. The majority opinion, he
claimed,
robs a patient of the very qualities protected by the right to
avoid unwanted medical treatment. His own degraded exis-
tence is perpetuated; the memory he leaves behind becomes
more and more distorted ... [and] the idea of being re-
membered in their persistent vegetative state rather than
as they were before their illness or accident may be very
disturbing.49
Despite the several opinions, two things stand out in the
decision. Most important, the Court for the first time acknowl-
edged a constitutionally protected right to die and grounded it
in the liberty interests of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause. Second, the Court allowed states great leeway
in establishing appropriate procedures for exercising that right.
Even Justice Scalia, the least sympathetic of the Justices to a
federally protected right, concurred with the majority's ruling;
he would have allowed the right, but set it within the context
of state rather than federal law.
Cruzan may not have been the best test case for a constitu-
tionally protected right to die, because while Missouri's appli-
cation of its laws certainly appeared harsh and unfair to the
Cruzans, it clearly fell within the states' traditional powers as
parens patriae to protect life and to look after the interests of
incompetent persons. Since only three states had such a high
evidentiary level, and the Court quite explicitly did not condi-
tion a right to die on adoption of such a test, it, in essence, left
the states to devise their own procedures even while confirming
that a federal threshold had to be met. As Justice O'Connor
noted approvingly, the Court had left "the more challenging
48. Id. at 302 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 311-12, 320.
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task of crafting appropriate procedures for safeguarding
incompetents' liberty interests ... to the 'laboratory' of the
States."5 °
And what about Nancy Cruzan? Following the Court's ruling
in June, 1990, the Cruzans went back to Judge Teel's chambers
with "new" evidence, testimony from friends that their daughter
had said she would never have wanted to be kept alive by
machines or feeding tubes. Attorney General Webster had won
his legal point, but aware of the immense sympathy the case
had generated for the Cruzans, he withdrew the state from the
case. Judge Teel heard the new evidence in November, 1990,
and, on December 14, 1990, gave the Cruzans what they had
sought for so long, an order permitting the withdrawal of the
feeding tube. The hospital removed the tubes and, twelve days
later, Nancy Beth Cruzan quietly died at 2:55 a.m. on the day
after Christmas.
In many ways, the cases leading up to and including Cruzan
presented the "easy" legal questions. Although different courts
had adopted differing notions of how a right to die may be ex-
pressed and what its bases are, there is a clear line from
Quinlan to Cruzan: competent patients, and lawful surrogates
for incompetent persons, may terminate medical treatment,
even if that termination will result in their death. The harder
cases would come as courts and society faced the more difficult
issue of people who wanted to end their lives immediately, and
not wait for the ravages of a disease to take its toll.
II
To many people, it is one thing for a terminally ill person
who is suffering great pain and loss of dignity to request that
life-support be withdrawn; the resulting death is, in many
ways, "natural," even a "blessing." They do not understand,
however, how someone who is not suffering from the ravages of
an incurable disease, who may have months-perhaps even
years---of life left to live, can deliberately elect death.
50. Id. at 292 (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
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A
Suicide puzzles and scares people; life, after all, is so pre-
cious, how can anyone not at death's door wish to open and
pass through that portal? As Shakespeare wrote: "Then is it
sin/ To rush into the secret house of death/ Ere death dare
come to us?"5 Western religions and law have both frowned on
suicide for centuries, yet it now appears that the miracles of
medical technology that can prolong life have also triggered a
new debate: is it acceptable to allow a person to choose death,
and if so, how may it be done, and who, if anyone, may assist?
Although some ancient Greek philosophies supported suicide,
popular attitudes in the West for many centuries have general-
ly viewed taking one's own life as unnatural. In Athenian law,
the hand that committed the suicide would be cut off and bur-
ied apart from the rest of the body, which itself would be de-
nied normal funeral rites. Yet many Greek writers acknowl-
edged the legitimacy of suicide under certain circumstances,
and the Romans found it even more acceptable; Roman law
never included any general prohibition of suicide. There were,
however, some special provisions. If a person committed suicide
to avoid forfeiture of property for a crime, the property would
still be forfeited. A soldier could also be punished for attempted
suicide, on the ground that this constituted a desertion of duty,
which was itself a crime against the state.52
Prohibitions against suicide made their way into canon law
beginning with St. Augustine, who, in The City of God, written
in the early fifth century, condemned self-murder as "a detest-
able and damnable wickedness."53 Augustine interpreted a
number of different biblical sources to "prove" that God had
forbidden suicide.54 Since secular authorities in the middle ag-
es recognized canon law as binding in any area related to
church teaching, the various pronouncements of the Catholic
51. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ANTONY AND CLEOPATRA act 4, sc. 15 (1623) quoted in
Joseph Fletcher, In Defense of Suicide, in SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA: THE RIGHTS OF
PERSONHOOD 40 (Samuel E. Wallace & Albin Eisen eds., 1981) [hereinafter Fletcher,
In Defense of Suicide].
52. See GLANVILLE WILMS, THE SANCTITY OF Lm'E AND THE CRImAL LAW 251-
54 (1957).
53. AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD, Bk. I, ch. 19 (1945).
54. See id.
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Church regarding self-murder quickly crowded out earlier pagan
acceptance of suicide. The edicts of the Council of Orleans, in
533, implied that suicide was worse than any other crime, and
the Council of Braga, in 563, denied to suicides normal funeral
rites, such as the eucharist and the singing of psalms. In Eng-
land, the Council of Hereford, in 673, adopted canon law, and
King Edgar, in 967, specifically affirmed the denial of burial
rites; in 1284, the Synod of Nimes ruled that suicides could not
be interred in holy ground. Dante, in The Inferno, put suicides
with murderers and blasphemers in the seventh circle of Hell.
The growth of the common law in England saw the canonical
rules, including the practice of dishonoring the corpse, absorbed
and strengthened. An early seventeenth-century writer noted
that the suicide "is drawn by a horse to the place of punish-
ment and shame, where he is hanged on a gibbet, and none
may take the body down but by the authority of a
magistrate."55 A century and a half later, Blackstone wrote
that suicides would be buried at a crossroads, with a stake
driven through the heart and a stone placed over the face. The
last known crossroads burial of a suicide in England took place
in 1823, after which Parliament passed a law calling for private
burial in a churchyard, but at night and without religious rites.
In 1882, an amendment allowed daytime interment, although
still without the Church of England ritual. Only a verdict by a
coroner's jury that the deceased had been mentally unbalanced,
and therefore not responsible for his or her actions, would allow
a normal church burial to proceed."
The early settlers of New England brought with them both
legal and religious proscriptions against suicide. In 1660, the
Massachusetts General Court, in "bear[ing] testimony against
such wicked and unnatural practices," ruled that self-murderers
shall be denied the privilege of being buried in the common
burying place of Christians, but shall be buried in some
common highway where the selectmen of the town ... shall
appoint, and a cartload of stones laid upon the grave, as a
55. Fletcher, In Defense of Suicide, supra note 51, at 42.
56. See WILLIAMS, supra note 52, at 259-60.
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brand of infamy, and as a warning to others to beware of
the like damnable practices.57
Although the practice fell into disuse, the statute itself was not
repealed until 1823. The United States, however, did not adopt
English common law crimes, so suicide was considered criminal
only in those states that specifically made it so by statute."
The self-murderer, being beyond the reach of the magistrate,
is no longer concerned with the law. But what of those who fail
in their attempts, who do not take sufficient poison or seda-
tives, whose aim is off, or whose boobytraps fail to work? Al-
though no state at this time criminalizes either suicide or at-
tempted suicide, that was not always the case. In many states,
attempted suicide was long considered a crime, and the person
who woke up after a failed attempt might well face criminal
prosecution." These statutes also traced back to English com-
mon law. The courts reasoned that every attempt to commit a
crime is punishable; if suicide was a crime, attempted suicide
could be punished.
But how did suicide itself get to be a crime? Self-murder
violated canon law, but the church, while condemning it as
mortal sin, only called for a denial of burial rites. Around the
tenth century, King Edgar ruled that a suicide's property would
be forfeited to his feudal lord; somewhat later the rule changed
so that a suicide's estate would be forfeited to the Crown. In
order to justify this change, the royal courts noted that every
felon forfeited his goods to the king; by making suicide a felony,
the general rule could be applied to suicide as well. In Hales v.
Petit,0 one of the first cases to classify suicide as a felony, the
court condemned self-murder as a criminal act, an offense
57. Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 426 (1877).
58. See 40 AM. JUR. 2d Homicide § 583 (1988). For an account of English and
American practice, as well as changing popular attitudes, see HOwARD J. KUSHNER,
SELF-DESTRUCTION IN THE PROMISED LAND: A PSYCHOCULTURAL BIOLOGY OF AMERICAN
SUICIDE (1989).
59. See, e.g., State v. La Fayette, 188 A. 948 (Camden County Ct. 1937) (holding
that an attempt at suicide is an indictable offense even though suicide itself was not
punishable under New Jersey law); State v. Willis, 121 S.E.2d 854 (N.C. 1961) (hold-
ing that an attempt to commit suicide is an indictable misdemeanor under state law).
60. 75 E.R. 398 (1562). The case rose out of the supposed suicide by drowning of
Justice Hales, and, incidentally, is considered to have inspired the gravedigger's collo-
quy in Hamlet.
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against nature, God, and the king. Blackstone denounced sui-
cide as "a double offence: one spiritual, in invading the preroga-
tive of the Almighty, and rushing into his immediate presence
uncalled for; the other temporal, against the king, who hath an
interest in the preservation of all his subjects."6
The first known case involving the legal punishment of at-
tempted suicide dates to 1854, in which the learned judges held
the criminality of attempted suicide a self-evident truth. 2
Within a few years other decisions confirmed the rule, and
what began as a moral indictment, enlarged by the monarch's
greed for property, became an accepted rule of common
law-suicide constituted a felony, and if the successful felon
escaped the law's punishment, the failed suicide would certainly
stand in the dock. Not until the Suicide Act of 1961 did Her
Majesty's Government finally stop making suicide or its attempt
a crime.
Other European countries had taken that step long before.
The writings of the eighteenth century criminologist Beccaria
led to the decriminalization of attempted suicide shortly after
the French Revolution, and most of the other countries of the
continent followed suit in the early nineteenth century. Even
when Germany, Italy, and Russia fell under the rule of totali-
tarian governments in the twentieth century and introduced
strict population policies, they did not re-enact criminal laws
regarding suicide or its attempt. In the United States, even in
those few jurisdictions which at one time made attempted sui-
cide a crime, there were no prosecutions. At worst, a failed
attempt, now as then, may lead to mandated therapy or per-
haps incarceration in a mental hospital." The criminal stigma
has disappeared, for the most part, although many religions
and many people still condemn self-murder as morally wrong.
61. 4 WILIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *189.
62. See Regina v. Doody, 6 Cox 453 (1854).
63. The notion of a "death wish" as evidence of mental incompetence has ap-
peared in a few judicial opinions. See, e.g., People v. Stanworth, 71 Cal.2d 820 (1969).
The Supreme Court, however, has refused to make this connection. "The empirical re-
lationship between mental illness and ... a suicide attempt need not always signal
an 'inability to perceive reality accurately." Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 181 n.16
(1975) (citation omitted).
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Despite the traditional antipathy toward suicide, in recent
years there has been a growing body of thought that looks upon
suicide as primarily an individual decision, and which holds
that a society that truly believes in individual autonomy should
permit suicide. Here, too, there is a tradition that goes back at
least to 1516, when Thomas More allowed for suicide in his
Utopia. A century later John Donne, in Biathanotos (published
posthumously in 1644), argued that contrary to classical Chris-
tian teachings, the taking of one's life is not incompatible with
the laws of nature, of reason, or of God. Perhaps the most fa-
mous of the early justifications is David Hume's essay, On
Suicide (also published posthumously in 1777), in which he
reasoned that a suicide is wrong only if it offends God, one's
neighbor, or one's self. Other writers of the Enlightenment,
including Voltaire, Rousseau, Montesquieu and d'Holbach, all
endorsed Hume's argument. The sheer number of volumes on li-
brary shelves dealing with suicide from ethical, sociological,
religious and metaphysical viewpoints show conclusively that it
is far from a moot issue today.
Recent studies also indicate that a majority of Americans
simply do not see ending one's life when one is terminally ill or
in great pain as suicide.' Polls show that as many as 90% of
Americans support the idea that terminally ill patients, or their
families when a patient is comatose, ought to have the right to
speed up their death by refusing medication.65 The support for
physician-assisted suicide also seems to be growing. In April
1990, the Roper poll found that 64% of Americans believed
terminally ill people should be able to ask for and receive help
from a doctor in order to die.6" A year later this number had
climbed to two out of three Americans, and in 1994 a Harris
poll set the figure at 73%."
64. See, e.g., Sanford H. Kadish, Letting Patients Die: Legal and Moral Reflections,
80 CAL. L. REV. 857, 860 & n.16 (1992).
65. See id.
66. See Robert Risley, Voluntary Active Euthanasia: The Next Frontier, Impact on
the Indigent, 8 ISSuEs IN L. & MED. 361, 365 (1992).
67. See Euthanasia Favored in Poll, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1991, at A16; see also
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 810 n.10 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing
THE ARiz. REPUBLIC, May 13, 1995).
1998] 331
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:313
Nowhere is it legal for doctors, or for that matter anyone
else, to assist in suicide. Forty-four states, the District of Co-
lumbia and two territories prohibit or condemn assisted sui-
cide."5 In April, 1997, President Clinton signed into law the
Federal Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act, 9 which pro-
hibits the use of federal funds in support of physician-assisted
suicide. In the Netherlands, the penal code forbids such prac-
tice, but the courts and the medical profession tacitly allow ac-
tive euthanasia under fairly well-defined guidelines. There is,
however, a great deal of dispute over the Dutch experience,
with both sides of the physician-assisted suicide debate in the
United States pointing to the Netherlands to support their
claims.°
This brief foray into the history of suicide and popular atti-
tudes towards "self-murder" are necessary to understand the
furor that greeted news of Dr. Jack Kevorkian's one-man cru-
sade to legitimize assisted suicide as well as the intense emo-
tions generated by the debate over whether assisted suicide
should be legalized.
B
On June 4, 1990, in an old van parked outside Detroit, Dr.
Jack Kevorkian, a retired pathologist, hooked up what he called
his "Mercy Machine" to fifty-four-year-old Janet Adkins, a Port-
land, Oregon, school teacher suffering from the early stages of
Alzheimer's disease.7 Ms. Adkins had read about Kevorkian, a
longtime advocate of physician-assisted suicide, and she had
contacted him in the fall of 1989. After some correspondence
and phone calls, Kevorkian agreed to help her end her life, and
Janet Adkins and her husband, Ron, had flown east to meet
68. See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 847 (Beezer, J., dissenting). A list of the
statutes can be found in Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2287 n.14 (1997)
(Souter, J., concurring).
69. Pub. L. 105-12, 111 Stat. 23 (1997) (codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 14401-08).
70. For arguments on both sides, see the citations in Glucksburg, 117 S. Ct. at
2292. I have deliberately avoided utilizing the Dutch experience in this article be-
cause I believe the evidence is contradictory, and can be manipulated to support a
variety of positions.
71. See Cynthia Gorney, Dr. Death's Life Obsession, WASH. PosT, Dec. 20, 1990,
at D1. Kevorkian had tried in vain to secure rooms at either a motel or a funeral
home, but when he had explained what he wanted to do, he had been turned away.
So the only place he had was an old 1968 Volkswagen van.
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with him. To provide evidence that she understood exactly what
she was doing, Kevorkian set up a video camera in a hotel
room, and recorded a forty-minute conversation with the
woman.
The next morning, Kevorkian showed Janet Adkins his de-
vice, three vials suspended over a metal box containing a small
electric motor. Once the doctor had inserted an intravenous
tube into her arm, she could press a button that would start
the flow of saline solution; then it would open the valve to the
second vial, releasing thiopental, which would induce uncon-
sciousness; finally, the contents of the third vial, potassium
chloride, would cause her heart to stop. Kevorkian again asked
Adkins if she understood what would happen, if she wanted to
go ahead, and if she knew what to do. She assured him she
did; Kevorkian then attached her to an electrocardiograph and
left the van. When he came back a little while later, Janet
Adkins was dead, and Kevorkian called the police to report the
death.72
As of this writing, Jack Kevorkian has reportedly helped
nearly one hundred people to die.73 Despite repeated efforts by
Michigan prosecutors and the state legislature, he has yet to be
convicted of any crime. Although denounced as a murderer by
many, there are others who consider him a hero, not just for
what he does, but for bringing the whole issue of physician-
assisted suicide into the public debate.
Kevorkian had decided to test his suicide machine in Michi-
gan because he believed that the state had no laws against
assisted suicide. 4 After several efforts to indict and convict
Kevorkian failed, after his license to practice medicine was
revoked, and after a court barred the use of his suicide ma-
chine, Kevorkian continued to help people to die. After the
number of assists had grown to fifteen, Michigan enacted an
anti-assisted suicide bill. 5 The law, which went into effect on
February 25, 1993, had two major provisions. The first estab-
72. See id. at D1, D2.
73. See Lawyer Puts Kevorkian Cases at Nearly 100", N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1997,
at A21.
74. See JACK KEVORKIAN, PRESCRIPTION: MEDICIDE 192 (1990).
75. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 752.1024(l) (West 1997).
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lished a twenty-member Commission on Death and Dying,
which had fifteen months to "develop and submit to the leg-
islature recommendations as to legislation concerning the volun-
tary self-termination of life."78 The second provision temporari-
ly criminalized assisted suicide for twenty-one months, and
spelled out the elements of the crime.77 That law, after being
declared invalid by the court of appeals," was eventually held
constitutional by the Michigan Supreme Court. 9 Kevorkian
continues his crusade, however, confident that juries sympa-
thetic to the plight of his patients (one can hardly call them
victims) will acquit him.0
C
Kevorkian is unique in that he sees himself as a prophet
and, along with his highly outspoken attorney, Geoffrey N.
Fieger, seeks publicity for his cause.81 The fact of the matter is
that doctors help their patients commit suicide every day of the
year. Most of them do so quietly and indirectly, with perhaps
only the family knowing or guessing the truth. The columnist
Anna Quindlen recalled a conversation she had once had with a
friend whose mother suffered from the pain of ovarian can-
cer.82 Her friend spoke of the wonderful oncologist treating her
mother, and how kind, patient and considerate he was, but
those were not his greatest virtues. "He told me how many of
my mother's painkillers constituted a lethal dose."'
76. Id.
77. See id. § 752.1027.
78. See People v. Kevorkian, 518 N.W.2d 487 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
79. See People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994).
80. According to one news report, Kevorkian was actually encountering fewer
hurdles in his work as Michigan state and local prosecutors appeared unwilling to
bring charges until a new and supposedly more enforceable law was on the books.
See Kevorkian Encountering Fewer Hurdles in Suicides, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1997, at
A26. There is very little case law on doctors assisting with suicide, but in nearly all
known cases, juries acquitted the physicians or the prosecution, aware it could not
secure a conviction, decided not to press the case. See Antonios P. Tsarouhas, The
Case Against Legal Assisted Suicide, 20 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 793, 798-99 (1994); Note,
Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Right to Die with Assistance, 105 HARV. L. REV.
2021, 2021 n.8 (1992).
81. See, e.g., Geoffrey N. Fieger, The Persecution and Prosecution of Doctor Death
and His Mercy Machine, 20 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 659 (1994).
82. Anna Quindlen, Seeking a Senve of Control, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1990, Section
4 (The Week in Review), at 17.
83. Id.
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Many doctors admit that the rate of suicide among the elder-
ly is far higher than the statistics indicate, and the known
suicide rate is twice that of younger groups.' Elderly people
often are prescribed powerful medicines, which if taken improp-
erly can cause death; the warnings indicating what is improper
use can also serve as a guide to suicide. One doctor, speaking
anonymously, said:
So the sick old man died at home in his own bed last night
instead of next fall in some intensive care unit. He was in
pain. He was suffering a lot. What good would come from
an autopsy that finds some lethal dose? rm not suspicious
of the family. So I sign the death certificate for "natural
causes."8
Another doctor, who had treated more than four hundred AIDS
patients, told each of them that whenever they thought treat-
ment or pain had become too much, he would provide medicine
for a painless suicide. Only four accepted his offer, but he re-
ported that they all felt that they had regained some control
over their lives. In 1989, when the doctor himself developed
AIDS, he took his own prescription, and his death certificate
did not list suicide as the cause of death.86
Doctors swear to protect life, but far more than most people
in society, they see death. They see people so diseased and
wracked with pain that death is preferable to life, and they are
unique in that they have the power and resources to release
people from their suffering. Although some newspapers con-
demned Kevorkian for "disgracing" the medical profession, doc-
tors may, both legally and ethically, help patients to die. The
doctor who agrees to forego treatment, or to help patients avoid
further treatment, is not assisting in suicide. Courts have con-
sistently ruled that foregoing treatment is not suicide because
the act of refusing treatment is not the cause of death; people
die from their illness, not from withdrawal of treatment. Sui-
84. See Western States Have the Highest Suicide Rate, U.S. Study Finds, BOSTON
GLOBE, Aug. 29, 1997, at A12.
85. Andrew H. Malcolm, Giving Death a Hand: Pending Issue, N.Y. TIMES, June
9, 1990, at A6.
86. See id.
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cide is self-inflicted death; the illness that leads to death is not
self-inflicted. 7
To some people, this appears as sophistry, the drawing of
fine lines to disguise or rationalize murder. But the law is
made of fine distinctions, not just in the criminal area, but in
civil law as well. One has to take into account the facts of the
situation, the motives of the actors, and the rights of both soci-
ety and the individual. Nor is the law immune from morality or
compassion, and that is as it ought to be.
Since doctors can help their patients die as well as live, it is
not surprising that people turn to them for assistance. Some
doctors are affronted by such requests; they have sworn to heal
people, not to kill them, and they refuse to be accessories to
suicide because of their own deeply felt moral convictions.88 On
the other hand, many doctors will, in one way or another, qui-
etly assist their patients to commit suicide. Despite the official
position of the American Medical Association, polls of doctors
show them to be greatly divided on this issue.8" A few months
after the Kevorkian story broke, one doctor came forward and
admitted that he had done just that.
D
Dr. Timothy Quill practices medicine in upstate Rochester,
New York. In March, 1991, he did what no doctor had done
before. He publicly discussed his role in assisting a patient to
87. See, e.g., supra note 3 and accompanying text; In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947,
955 (Me. 1987); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976); In re Lydia E. Hall Hosp.,
455 N.Y.S.2d 706, 711 (Sup. Ct. 1982). Courts have also ruled, in states that have
Natural Death Acts, that "acts in accordance with a directive are not deemed sui-
cide . . . and the cause of death shall be that which placed the patient in a terminal
condition." In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 751 (Wash. 1983). According to the American
Medical Association, "[wihen a life-sustaining treatment is declined, the patient dies
primarily because of an underlying disease." Report of the Council on Ethical and
Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association, 10 IssuEs IN L. & MED. 91, 93
(1994).
88. The official position of the American Medical Association is that "physician-
assisted suicide is fundamentally incompatible with the physician's role as healer."
CODE OF ETics RULE 2.211 (1994). But doctors will sometimes see that "healing"
may not be in the best interests of the patient, and how wrenching an issue this can
be for doctors is explored in Richard Selzer, A Question of Mercy, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Sept. 22, 1991, at 32.
89. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2302, 2309 n.12 (1997) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (citing studies on this issue).
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commit suicide, and he did so in an article in the prestigious
New England Journal of Medicine.9" Unlike Kevorkian, who
often, met his patients only a day or two before he helped them
to die, Quill had been the longtime physician to a patient he
called "Diane." When she developed acute leukemia he urged
her to begin chemotherapy and have a bone-marrow transplant.
But Diane knew that the odds of success were slim, the pain
and distress great, and she decided to commit suicide. At first,
Quill refused to help her, and referred her to the Hemlock
Society. Then she called and asked him for barbitu-
rates-sleeping pills-because she was having trouble sleeping.
Quill knew this was true, but he also suspected that Diane
intended to hoard the pills and then take an overdose; nonethe-
less, he wrote the prescription."'
Diane's condition grew worse. She made her farewells to
friends and family, and asked Quill to come over to say good-
bye. A few days later, her husband called and said Diane had
died quietly on the couch; Quill reported the cause of death as
acute leukemia. It was the truth, but not the whole truth, and
he did it to protect both the family and himself from investiga-
tion and possible prosecution for assisting in a suicide.92
Up until this point, Quill's story is similar to hundreds,
perhaps thousands, of deaths that occur in the United States
every year. But then, Timothy Quill decided to talk about it, in
part to relieve the intense emotional stress the experience had
produced, but also to lift the shroud on a widespread practice,
bring it into the open, and make it more honest. He consulted
with state attorneys before deciding to publish his account and
was told he would probably not face prosecution. Since, how-
ever, assisting suicide is a felony in New York, punishable by a
five to fifteen-year prison sentence, local prosecutors did bring
the case to a Rochester grand jury. The panel, however, refused
to indict Quill, and the prosecutor declined to file an informa-
tion."
90. See Timothy E. Quill, Death and Dignity: A Case of Individualized Decision
Making, 324 NEw ENG. J. MED. 691 (1991).
91. See id. at 693.
92. See id. at 694.
93. See Lawrence K Altman, Jury Declines to Indict a Doctor Who Said He Aided
in a Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1991, at Al.
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For the most part, Quill's story elicited as much praise as
Kevorkian's had brought forth condemnation. Medical ethicists
Arthur Caplan and George Annas, both of whom had been criti-
cal of Kevorkian, found Quill's situation far different. Annas
put it quite simply: "I want this guy as my doctor. The vast
majority of people ... would want somebody like this."4 Quill
went on to write two books advocating physician-assisted sui-
cide,95 and became the lead plaintiff in attempting to overturn
the New York law under which he might have been indicted."
E
The debate that Kevorkian and Quill triggered has operated
on several levels, but it has certainly not been hidden. In par-
ticular, a series of referenda in western states demonstrates
vividly not only how attitudes are changing, but also how open
the debate has been. In November, 1991, voters went to the
polls in the State of Washington to cast their ballots on Initia-
tive 119. Entitled a "death with dignity" measure, the proposal
would have authorized doctors to administer lethal injections to
incurably ill patients. The patient had to make the request in
writing, and had to have been diagnosed by two doctors as
having less than six months to live. Two impartial persons, who
were not members of the patient's family, had to witness the
written request. If Initiative 119 had passed, the state would
have become the first jurisdiction in the world to legalize a
form of euthanasia.
The Hemlock Society provided the major backing for Initia-
tive 119, arguing that the proposal would provide terminally ill
people with freedom of choice. Both proponents and opponents
of the initiative flooded the state with media spots. In one ad-
vertisement, a hospice worker charged that "Initiative 119
94. Julianne Malveaux, For Millions, This Isn't the Issue, USA TODAY, Mar. 12,
1991, at 8A. Polls taken at the time indicated that five to seven out of every ten
adults believed that people suffering from incurable disease should be allowed to
commit suicide. See Peter Steinfels, Beliefs: Euthanasia, a Radical Issue That De-
mands Careful Consideration, Rather Than Drifting Judgment, N.Y. TIMES, May 11,
1991, at A9.
95. See TIMOTHY E. QUILL, DEATH AND DIGNITY: MAKING CHOICES AND TAKING
CHARGE (1993); TIMOTHY E. QUILL, A MIDWIFE THROUGH THE DYING PROCESS: STO-
RIES OF HEALING AND HARD CHOICES AT THE END OF LIFE (1996).
96. See infra Part IV.
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would let doctors kill my patients,9 while in another a wom-
an who had been diagnosed with cancer seven years earlier told
how glad she was to still be alive. Yes, there had been some
rough moments, and if Initiative 119 had been in effect, she
might have chosen death; but she was happy to still be alive.
Supporters of the measure ran equally emotional advertise-
ments, with stories of people who died agonizing deaths. One
woman, Vera Belt, told how her mother had died in great pain
from throat cancer after doctors had refused her pleas for help
in ending her life." When Belt's sister became similarly ill,
she knew what awaited her, and so she killed herself by putt-
ing a gun in her mouth and pulling the trigger.
The proposal split religious and medical groups. The Catholic
Church strongly opposed the measure, but more than two hun-
dred Protestant ministers from mainstream and liberal groups
endorsed it. United Church of Christ minister Dale Turner, a
supporter of Initiative 119, declared that "[w]e're on the frontier
of the world," and dismissed concerns that people too readily
would choose suicide if it became so easily available.99 The
seventy-four year old Turner said that "[n]obody loves life like
an old man .... A person has to be pretty ill and desperate to
want to leave."'
A number of doctors bitterly fought the proposal. They had
been trained to save lives, not to take them, and they saw
Initiative 119 as opening the doors to a flood of abuse. When
the Washington State Medical Society debated the issue, dele-
gates voted five to one against it, but a poll of the general
membership taken earlier in the year showed doctors split rath-
er evenly. One can surmise that although doctors do help some
of their patients die, they prefer to keep this part of their prac-
tice quiet. To legalize physician-assisted suicide would mean
additional regulation of medical practice. Although early signs
indicated that Initiative 119 would pass, opponents gained
ground as election day approached. Critics claim that American
97. Lou Cannon, Assisted Killing of Fatally Ill on State Ballot, WASH. POST, Nov.
3, 1991, at A6.
98. See id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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voters are apathetic, but Initiative 119 galvanized the populace,
and voters came out in large numbers. The initiative failed by
a 54-46% margin.'0 ' Both sides agreed that the debate had
been useful and that an important public policy issue had been
raised, one that would not quietly go away."2 "If we don't
deal with the problems raised by 119, we'll be facing this issue
again and again and again," said Dr. Peter McGough, an oppo-
nent of the measure. McGough stated further that "[s]aying no
to assisted death is not enough. Now we have a responsibility
to deal with the problems that brought out this concern."'0 3
Although lawyers and legal scholars played little public role
in the Initiative 119 campaign, they too could not ignore the
legal questions engendered by the measure. To begin with,
proponents of Initiative 119 spoke not only of a right to die and
death with dignity, both of which are now generally accepted
notions, but also of a right to physician-assisted suicide. In a
New York Times/CBS News poll taken in the spring of 1990 on
the question of whether a doctor should help a terminally ill
person die, 53% said "yes," 42% said "no," with the rest unde-
cided."° Moreover, even before the vote on Initiative 119,
courts had begun to hear arguments asserting a constitutionally
protected right to assisted suicide.
In 1986, Elizabeth Bouvia, one of the best-known patients
seeking to end her life, filed a suit in California court to have
her feeding tube removed. In a concurring opinion, Judge Lynn
D. Compton wrote:
The right to die is an integral part of our right to control
our own destinies so long as the rights of others are not
affected. That right should... include the ability to enlist
assistance from others, including the medical profession, in
making death as painless and quick as possible.' °5
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. Id. The following year, a similar ballot initiative in California, Initiative 161,
was also defeated by an identical margin. See Robert Reinhold, Move to Limit Terms
Gathers Steam After Winning in 14 States, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1992, at B8.
104. See Malcolm, supra note 85, at A6.
105. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1147 (1986).
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In January, 1987, lawyers for Hector Rodas filed a petition in
Mesa County District Court in Colorado asserting that their
client had a right to assisted suicide. In particular, Rodas' at-
torneys requested that he "be confirmed as having the constitu-
tional and privacy right to receive medication and medicinal
agents, from a consenting health care professional or institu-
tion, which will result in a comfortable and dignified de-
mise.""° At the time, Rodas was dying of self-imposed starva-
tion and dehydration, after having won a battle in the same
court a week earlier to force the Hilltop Rehabilitation Hospital
to withdraw his feeding tubes and allow him to remain in the
hospital until he died. Rodas had not been considered terminal-
ly ill, but the thirty-four-year-old man was paralyzed from the
neck down and did not want to continue living. The local court
had no problem with disconnecting the feeding tubes on a theo-
ry of personal autonomy, even though it recognized that such
an action would lead to Rodas' death. The magistrate, however,
had a great deal of difficulty with the request for assistance,
and must have breathed a sigh of relief when Rodas died before
he had to rule on the question.'
F
In November, 1992, a measure similar to Washington's Initia-
tive 119 was defeated in California, by an identical 54-46%."08
On Election Day 1994, however, Oregon voters, by a margin of
627,980 to 596,018, passed Measure 16, the Oregon Death with
Dignity Act, making Oregon the first jurisdiction in the world
to make assisted suicide legal.0 9 The Oregon initiative was
more carefully constructed than the measures that were defeat-
ed in neighboring states. To safeguard against abuses, the Act
applies only in the last six months of life, mandates a second
opinion about the patient's condition, requires multiple re-
quests, has two waiting periods, and limits the type of aid that
106. James Bopp, Jr., Is Assisted Suicide Constitutionally Protected?, 3 ISSUES IN L.
& MED. 113, 113 (1987) (quoting Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Rodas v.
Erkenbrack, No. 870UK12 (Dist. Ct. Mesa County, Colo. 1987), reprinted in 2 ISsUES
N L. & MED. 499 (1987)).
107. See id.
108. See Reinhold, supra note 103, at B8.
109. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-.897 (1996). The full text is also found in Lee v.
Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382, 1392 (9th Cir. 1997).
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a physician can offer to prescribing, but not administering,
medication."0
The debate in Oregon followed much the same pattern as the
debates in California and Washington, with religious and advo-
cacy groups arguing primarily on moral grounds. Oregon doc-
tors, however, breaking with the national office of the American
Medical Association, which opposed Measure 16, decided to
remain neutral. After a heated debate, the state's medical asso-
ciation could find no consensus among its members."'
Almost immediately after passage of Measure 16, a group of
physicians, patients and hospitals challenged the law on the
grounds that it violated the Equal Protection and the Due Pro-
cess Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the First
Amendment and the Americans with Disabilities Act. The gist
of their complaint was that Measure 16 denied terminally ill
patients the same type of safeguards against committing suicide
under undue influence or while suffering from depression as
that provided for nonterminally ill people."' Chief Judge Mi-
chael R. Hogan of the federal district court found numerous
inadequacies in the Act's protections for the terminally ill,"'
no rational basis for the distinction between terminally ill and
nonterminally ill,"' and concluded that the act did violate the
Equal Protection Clause."' The state appealed, and, in a rela-
tively brief opinion, Judge Melvin Brunetti of the Ninth Circuit
vacated the lower court ruling on grounds that the claims were
not ripe and the plaintiffs had no standing. 6
It is too early to tell how the Oregon program will work.
Although Measure 16 is fairly specific, there are a number of
110. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-.897 (1996); see also The Uncharted Waters of
Oregon's Assisted Suicide Law, CHOICES, Summer 1995, at 1 [hereinafter Uncharted
Waters].
111. See Timothy Egan, Suicide Law Placing Oregon on Several Uncharted Paths,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1994, at Al.
112. See Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1431.
113. See id. at 1434-37.
114. See id. at 1434.
115. See id. at 1434-37.
116. See Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997). The case had been argued
before the Ninth Circuit panel on July 9, 1996, but the court withheld judgment once
it learned that the Supreme Court had accepted two cases dealing with assisted sui-
cide.
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technical problems to be resolved. Doctors are still discussing
how a patient's request for lethal medication should be honored.
Pharmacists, who are often called upon by customers for infor-
mation about medications, wonder what advice they should give
to persons who hand them prescriptions for lethal drug dosages,
and whether any liability will result from filling these prescrip-
tions. The law provides for adult Oregon residents, but how is
that to be defined, and will that definition conflict with federal
and constitutional provisions about residency? Will other op-
tions, such as hospice care, be ignored by people for whom that
may be the best choice?" 7
Even those who favor physician-assisted suicide recognize
that there are many potential problems. Doctors educated to
save lives as their primary concern will have to learn new
skills and attitudes. Dr. Martin Skinner, an internist in subur-
ban Portland, had mixed feelings about Measure 16. He told a
reporter, "I don't know how to deal with it. I can conceive of
myself being in a position to make such a decision, but I hon-
estly do not know what I would do.""' The law's definition of
a terminally ill patient, one with six months or less to live, is
also problematic. According to Skinner, doctors are fairly accu-
rate in determining how long someone has to live when the
illness is cancer, but there is far less certainty with other dis-
eases."' There is also concern about how the law will affect
the vulnerable, which was one of the main concerns that led
Judge Hogan initially to block Measure 16's implementation.
Will there be undue pressure on elderly patients, whose illness
is a financial and emotional drain on their families, to do the
"right" thing and opt for suicide? Arthur Caplan, director of the
Center for Bioethics at the University of Pennsylvania School of
Medicine, could not predict what the exact consequences of the
Oregon initiative would be. He did declare, however, that the
"legalization of any form of assisted suicide will have just tre-
mendous consequences that will reverberate through American
society . . .. 20
117. See Uncharted Waters, supra note 110, at 6.
118. Egan, supra note 111, at B14.
119. See id.
120. Voters in Oregon Allow Doctors to Help the Terminally Ill Die, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 11, 1994, at A28.
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III
A
Even as interest groups sought to bypass legislatures through
initiatives, other supporters of physician-assisted suicide went
to court in efforts to overturn existing statutes criminalizing
such practice. The first case to test a state's assisted suicide
law in federal court arose in Washington, where Initiative 119
had been so vigorously debated in 1991.121 On January 29,
1994, three terminally ill patients, five doctors, and a nonprofit
organization called "Compassion in Dying" filed suit in the
federal district court in Seattle." The suit challenged a
Washington statute that held "[a] person is guilty of promoting
a suicide attempt when he knowingly causes or aids another
person to attempt suicide."" Promoting suicide is a class C
felony punishable by imprisonment for up to five years and by
a fine of up to ten thousand dollars." The Washington law
had been on the books in one form or another since 1854, but
had rarely been enforced. Even Compassion in Dying, while
seemingly operating in violation of the statute, had never been
threatened with prosecution." The state, it should be noted,
had no law prohibiting suicide or attempted suicide.
"Jane Roe," a sixty-nine-year-old retired pediatrician, suffered
from cancer that had metastasized throughout her skeleton. She
had been almost completely bedridden and in constant pain
since June, 1993.126 "John Doe," a forty-four-year-old artist,
had been diagnosed with AIDS in 1991, and his physical condi-
tion had deteriorated consistently since that time. He had also
been the primary caregiver for his long-term companion who
had died of AIDS in June, 1991.127 Both of these patients died
before the case came to trial. The third patient, sixty-nine-year-
old "James Poe," suffered from emphysema, which caused him a
121. See supra Part II.E.
122. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash.
1994) [hereinafter Compassion in Dying 11.
123. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.060(1) (1988).
124. See id. §§ 9A.36.060(2), 9A.20.020(1)(c).
125. See Timothy Egan, Federal Judge Says Ban on Suicide Aid is Unconstitution-
al, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1994, at Al.
126. See Compassion in Dying I, 850 F. Supp. at 1456.
127. See id.
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constant sensation of suffocating, for which he had to take
morphine on a regular basis to calm the panic reaction." All
three patients were mentally competent and all wished to com-
mit suicide by taking physician-prescribed drugs.
The five physicians regularly treated terminally ill patients.
Harold Glucksberg was an assistant professor of oncology at the
University of Washington School of Medicine. In his declaration
to the court, Glucksberg wrote:
Plain management at this stage often requires the patient
to choose between enduring unrelenting pain or surrender-
ing an alert mental state because the dose of drugs ade-
quate to alleviate the pain will impair consciousness. Many
patients will choose one or the other of these options; how-
ever, some patients do not want to end their days racked
with pain or in a drug-induced stupor. For some patients
pain cannot be managed even with aggressive use of
drugs.m
The other doctors were John P. Geyman, chair of the Depart-
ment of Family Medicine at the University of Washington
School of Medicine; Thomas A. Preston, chief of cardiology at
the Pacific Medical Center in Seattle; Abigail Halperin, a family
practitioner; and Peter Shalit, an internist whose practice in-
cluded a large number of HIV and AIDS patients. Drs.
Halperin and Shalit were also clinical instructors at the Univer-
sity of Washington School of Medicine.'
Compassion in Dying provides information, counseling and
assistance to terminally ill patients considering suicide and to
their families. The organization has a strict protocol regarding
the eligibility of people it will help. Patients must be terminally
ill and, in the judgment of the primary care physician, mentally
competent and able to understand the consequences of their
decisions. Requests must come from the patient, in writing or
on videotape, at least three times, with an interval of forty-
eight hours between the second and third request. The organi-
zation will not assist anyone who expresses ambivalence or
128. See id. at 1457.
129. Id. (quoting Declaration of Harold Glucksberg, M.D., at 3-5).
130. See id. at 1457-58.
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uncertainty about committing suicide, and, if members of the
immediate family express objections, Compassion in Dying will
not help."'
The plaintiffs all challenged the Washington law, but on
somewhat differing grounds. The patients alleged that they had
a constitutionally protected liberty interest recognized in the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause to secure physi-
cian assistance for suicide without undue governmental interfer-
ence. 2 They also attacked the statute on equal protection
grounds." The physicians claimed that the Fourteenth
Amendment protects their right to practice medicine consistent
with their best professional judgment, including the right to
assist competent, terminally ill patients end their lives. Com-
passion in Dying feared that in carrying out its mission of as-
sisting terminally ill patients commit suicide, it could be crimi-
nally prosecuted for its activities "in assisting dying persons as
they exercise their alleged constitutional right to hasten their
own deaths.""
Chief Judge Barbara Rothstein began her legal analysis,
handed down on May 3, 1994, by granting the plaintiffs' claim
of a liberty interest. The Supreme Court, she noted, had estab-
lished "through a long line of cases that personal decisions
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relation-
ships, child rearing and education are constitutionally protect-
ed.""' She cited the Court's decision in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey"' that matters "involving the most intimate and per-
sonal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central
to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.""7 Although Casey
dealt with abortion, Rothstein found the decision of a terminal-
ly ill person to end his or her own life to be of the same catego-
131. See id. at 1458.
132. See id. at 1459.
133. See id.
134. Id. at 1459.
135. Id.
136. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
137. Compassion in Dying 1, 850 F. Supp. at 1459 (citing Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
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ry of "the most intimate and personal choices" and "central to
personal dignity and autonomy." '
Similarly, the Supreme Court in Casey had spoken of the
suffering of the pregnant woman, which "is too intimate and
personal for the State to insist, without more, upon its own
vision of the woman's role, however dominant that vision has
been in the course of our history and our culture.""9 The dis-
trict court therefore concluded "that the suffering of a terminal-
ly ill person cannot be deemed any less intimate or personal, or
any less deserving of protection from unwarranted governmen-
tal interference, than that of a pregnant woman."
The court also found a liberty interest recognized in the
Cruzan decision, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist had held
"that the United States Constitution would grant a competent
person a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving
hydration and nutrition."' The court then asked rhetorically
whether a constitutional difference could be drawn between
"refusal or withdrawal of medical treatment which results in
death, and the situation in this case involving competent, ter-
minally ill individuals who wish to hasten death by self-admin-
istering drugs prescribed by a physician."" 2 "From a constitu-
tional perspective," Judge Rothstein concluded, "the court does
not believe that a distinction can be drawn between refusing
life-sustaining medical treatment and physician-assisted suicide
by an uncoerced, mentally competent, terminally ill adult.""
As both Cruzan and Casey showed, liberty interests are not
absolute, and the question then becomes what standard of re-
view is necessary to determine if the state has trespassed onto
constitutionally protected territory. The court adopted the stan-
dard enunciated in Casey, whether the "state regulation impos-
es an undue burden on a woman's ability to make [a] decision"
concerning whether or not to procure an abortion.' Applying
138. Id. at 1459-60.
139. Casey, 505 U.S. at 852.
140. Compassion in Dying I, 850 F. Supp. at 1460.
141. Id. at 1461 (citing Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279
(1990)).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1462 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992)).
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that analysis, the court then looked at the two interests the
state had put forward in justification of the statute, namely,
preventing suicide and preventing improper influence and
abuse.
The state had a very weak case from the start because
Washington prohibits neither suicide nor attempted suicide and,
in 1975, had repealed a previous law that did, in fact, bar at-
tempted suicide." 5 While conceding that the state had a
strong interest in deterring suicide by young people, the court
drew a sharp distinction between abruptly cutting a young life
short and the situation of terminally ill patients, for whom
preventing suicide meant only the prolongation of an often
painful dying process. While the state had a legitimate interest
in protecting the young, it had gone too far in extending the
prohibition to terminally ill patients.'46
The state's second interest, protecting people from undue
influence and abuse, has been one of the major arguments
utilized by opponents of assisted suicide. They fear that when a
person becomes elderly and a burden on her family, she will be
subject to pressure to "take the easy way out" for the sake of
the family. The court, however, found little to distinguish be-
tween permitting withdrawal of medical treatment that led to
death and providing drugs that led to the same desired result.
As for the potential risks and abuses, tests already existed to
evaluate the mental competency of the patient as well as the
voluntariness of the decision. "Undoubtedly the legislature can
devise regulations which would set up a mechanism for ensur-
ing that people who decide to commit physician-assisted suicide
are not acting pursuant to abuse, coercion or undue influence
from third parties."4 '
Having found that the state did impose an undue burden on
the exercise of a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, Judge Rothstein then turned to the most inter-
esting part of her analysis, equal protection. The Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, she noted, "is essentially
a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated
145. See id. at 1464 (referencing 1975 Wash. Laws § 9A.36.060)).
146. See id. at 1464-65.
147. Id. at 1465 n.10.
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alike."1" In equal protection analysis, a higher standard of
review, that of strict scrutiny, is used as opposed to the undue
burden standard of a liberty interest. The plaintiffs claimed
that Washington State law unconstitutionally distinguished
between two groups of similarly situated people, those on life-
support or under medical treatment whose withdrawal would
mean death, and those who were likewise terminally ill, but not
on life-sustaining equipment or treatment. The Washington
Natural Death Act clearly stated that "adult persons have the
fundamental right to control the decisions relating to the ren-
dering of their own health care, including the decision to have
the life-sustaining treatment withheld or withdrawn in instanc-
es of a terminal condition or permanent unconscious condi-
tion."149
The court agreed, finding that no significant difference exist-
ed between adult, mentally competent, terminally ill patients on
life-support, who could decide to end their suffering by turning
off the equipment, and adult, mentally competent, terminally ill
patients who wished to end their suffering by committing sui-
cide. By making such a distinction, Washington "creates a situ-
ation in which the fundamental rights of one group are bur-
dened while those of a similarly situated group are not."'0
The state's law, therefore, violated the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause.'5'
Judge Rothstein granted summary judgment in favor of the
plaintiff patients, and for the doctors insofar as they "purport to
raise claims on behalf of their terminally ill patients."5 ' She
denied, however, judgment insofar as any claims raised on their
own behalf. Similarly, she denied judgment for Compassion in
Dying, since it also sought relief for itself as opposed to its
clients. Finally, Judge Rothstein declined to enter an injunction
barring the state from enforcing the law on the grounds that
the responsibility for enforcing criminal laws rests primarily on
148. Id. at 1466 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S.
432, 439 (1985)).
149. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.122.010 (Supp. 1998).
150. Compassion in Dying I, 850 F. Supp. at 1467.
151. See id.
152. Id.
3491998]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:313
county prosecuting attorneys, and not on the Attorney General,
who had been named as a defendant.5 '
Proponents of assisted suicide hailed Judge Rothstein's deci-
sion. Ralph Mero, a Unitarian minister who served as executive
director of Compassion in Dying, said he expected a "tremen-
dous increase" in the number of people coming to the organiza-
tion for aid. "Today, every time I pick up the phone, there are
three more people on voice mail asking for help."" Just as
predictably, opponents attacked the ruling. The Roman Catholic
bishops of Washington State, who had played a leading role in
fighting Initiative 119, declared that assisted suicide "under-
mines the moral integrity of the medical profession whose duty
it is to heal and comfort, not kill. And it tramples on our con-
viction that life, no matter how feeble or impaired, is a sacred
gift from God." 5
William F. Buckley, in his nationally syndicated column,
attacked Rothstein's decision as one more unreasonable expan-
sion of the so-called right of privacy. 55 He also saw no differ-
ence between a doctor who prescribed lethal medication and a
mechanic
who plants a bomb under your car, runs an electrical line
to your window sill but leaves it to you to depress the but-
ton when your wife enters the car. What was worse, in
terms of a democratic society, is that once again judges had
usurped the right of the people to decide such matters
through their elected representatives.15
B
The State of Washington appealed Judge Rothstein's decision,
and a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit con-
sisting of Eugene A. Wright, John T. Noonan, Jr., and
Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain heard arguments on December 7,
1994. By a vote of 2-1, the panel reversed the district court."
153. See id. at 1468 n.13.
154. Egan, supra note 125, at Al.
155. Id.
156. See William F. Buckley, Giving Life to New 'Rights" in the Advancement of
Death, RICH. TIMEs-DISPATCH, May 11, 1994, at A13.
157. Id.
158. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995) [hereinafter
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In an opinion written by Judge Noonan, the majority held that
the district court's conclusion that the Washington statute de-
prived plaintiffs of both a liberty interest protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment and equal protection "cannot be sus-
tained."'69
Judge Noonan noted that the lower court had relied on the
wording of Casey to analogize between the privacy involved in
pregnancy and a similar intimacy in dying."8 In a remarkably
refreshing comment, he declared that
[a]ny reader of judicial opinions knows they often attempt a
generality of expression and a sententiousness of phrase
that extend far beyond the problem addressed. It is com-
monly accounted an error to lift sentences or even para-
graphs out of context and insert the abstracted thought into
a wholly different context. 6'
Judge Noonan found completely inapposite the district court's
effort to equate the terms "personal dignity and autonomy" as
used in Casey with the decision to choose death.
The category created is inherently unstable. The depressed
twenty-one year old, the romantically-devastated twenty-
eight year old, the alcoholic forty-year old who choose sui-
cide are also expressing their views of the existence, mean-
ing, the universe, and life; they are also asserting their
personal liberty.... The attempt to restrict such rights to
the terminally ill is illusory. If such liberty exists in this
context, as Casey asserted in the context of reproductive
rights, every man and woman in the United States must
enjoy it .... This conclusion is a reductio ad absurdum."'6
Judge Noonan's argument, which relied heavily on an article
by a long-time opponent of assisted suicide, Professor Yale
Kamisar of Michigan,' is, indeed, an absurdity in the form
Compassion in Dying Il]. The case had already drawn a great deal of attention, and
numerous groups, most of whom wanted to allow physician-assisted suicide, had en-
tered amici briefs. For a list of the amici in the district court, see Compassion in
Dying I, 850 F. Supp. at 1456 n.1. For the much larger list of amici in the court of
appeals, see Compassion in Dying II, 49 F.3d at 587-588.
159. Compassion in Dying II, 49 F.3d at 590.
160. See id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 590-91.
163. See Yale Kamisar, Are Laws Against Assisted Suicide Unconstitutional?, 23
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stated, but it avoided coming to grips with the heart of the
autonomy argument. If people are truly autonomous, and if that
autonomy is protected by the law (either as a Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interest or as a Ninth Amendment reserved
right), then suicide is an option that must be open to one who
is adult and competent.'" The three examples Judge Noonan
cited are all, arguably, not competent, and there is certainly a
significant difference between the alcoholic of whatever age and
a terminally ill patient in great pain, also of whatever age.
Judge Noonan went on to attack Judge Rothstein's ruling on
other grounds. While Cruzan certainly dealt with end-of-life is-
sues, the Supreme Court had made it quite clear that the enun-
ciated right to die was circumscribed by a state's interest in
preserving life, a portion of Cruzan ignored in the lower court
ruling." He dismissed the lower court's analysis as lacking
"foundation in the traditions of our nation," and noted that "[in
the two hundred and five years of our existence no constitution-
al right to aid in killing oneself has ever been asserted and
upheld by a court of final jurisdiction."66 Judge Noonan went
on to lecture Judge Rothstein on the importance of judicial re-
straint. "Unless the federal judiciary is to be a floating constitu-
tional convention, a federal court should not invent a constitu-
tional right unknown to the past and antithetical to the defense
of human life that has been a chief responsibility of our consti-
tutional government." 7 Judge Noonan also found the facial
invalidation of the statute unwarranted by the Casey prece-
dent." Most importantly, the district court had completely ig-
nored the State of Washington's real interest in protecting
life.'69 In addition, the lower court had entered a judgment on
behalf of two plaintiffs already dead. "This unheard-of judgment
was a nullity."' Finally, Judge Noonan dismissed the equal
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 32 (1993).
164. The argument for suicide as an expression of personal autonomy, with appro-
priate safeguards, is set forth in TOM L. BEAUCHAMP AND JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRIN-
CIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 87 (1979); for a defense of suicide from a humanist
viewpoint, see JOSEPH FLETCHER, HUMANHOOD: ESSAYS IN BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (1979).
165. See Compassion in Dying II, 49 F.3d at 591.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See id.
169. See id. at 591-92.
170. Id. at 593.
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rights analysis by stating that ending life-support for a termi-
nally ill patient, and letting the underlying condition bring on
death, was a far different thing than actively terminating
life.1
71
The strongest part of Judge Noonan's argument lay in his
analysis of the state's interest. Chief Justice Rehnquist in
Cruzan had made it clear that a right to die existed, although
circumscribed by state interests. Judge Noonan completely ig-
nored the end-of-life issues for those in pain from an incurable
disease. In part, Judge Noonan wanted to rectify what he saw
as a major error in Judge Rothstein's analysis, her dismissal of
alleged state interests.
Judge Noonan listed five such interests: (1) The interest in
not having doctors act as the killers of their patients; (2) the
interest in not subjecting the elderly and the infirm to psycho-
logical pressure to consent to their own deaths; (3) the interest
in protecting the poor and minorities, who would be especially
susceptible to exploitation; (4) the interest in protecting all of
the handicapped from societal indifference and antipathy; and
(5) the interest in preventing abuses similar to those occurring
in the Netherlands. 72 In his opinion, Judge Noonan made no
reference to Judge Rothstein's extended analysis of which stan-
dard of review to utilize, 73 but in dismissing both the liberty
interest and equal protection arguments, he adopted what
amounted to a simple rational basis test. The state had legiti-
mate interests, and, therefore, the statute was constitutional.
Judge Noonan was undoubtedly right in his assertion that
the state has interests in preserving life. If, however, the lower
court decision went too far in its efforts to address the concerns
of the terminally ill, the majority opinion in the court of ap-
peals had little to say on that score, except a sort of apologia at
the end. Judge Noonan agreed that compassion is a great vir-
tue, and "[n]o one can read the accounts of the sufferings of the
deceased plaintiffs supplied by their declarations, or the ac-
counts of the sufferings of their patients supplied by the physi-
171. See id.
172. See id. at 592-93.
173. See Compassion in Dying I, 850 F. Supp. at 1462-64.
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cians, without being moved by them."74 But "[c]ompassion
cannot be the compass of a federal judge. That compass is the
Constitution of the United States. Where, as here in the case of
Washington, the statute of a state comports with that compass,
the validity of the statute must be upheld."'75
Judge Eugene A. Wright entered a relatively brief dissent in
which he asserted that the real right involved was that of pri-
vacy, and the "right to die with dignity falls squarely within
the privacy right recognized by the Supreme Court."'76 Judge
Wright agreed with the lower court that no constitutional dis-
tinction could be drawn between refusing life-sustaining treat-
ment and taking a physician prescribed drug to hasten
death.'77 Additionally, he was able to point to a higher au-
thority for this argument, Justice Scalia's concurrence in
Cruzan, in which he stated that "starving oneself to death is no
different from putting a gun to one's-temple as far as the com-
mon-law definition of suicide is concerned .... 178
In answer to Judge Noonan's appeal for judicial restraint,
Judge Wright argued that substantive due process had always
evolved to meet new societal needs.'79 An appeal to history
and tradition is useless where medicine is concerned because of
the rapid changes taking place in that field. In essence, one has
to craft a law dealing with the medical realities of the late
twentieth century, not that of the late eighteenth. Even if one
appeals to history and tradition, Judge Wright found the values
of self-determination and privacy regarding personal decisions
to always have been highly prized.
"No right is held more sacred, or more carefully guarded, by
the common law, than the right of every individual to the
possession and control of his own person, free from all re-
straint or interference of others unless by clear and unques-
tioned authority." The right to die with dignity accords with
174. Compassion in Dying II, 49 F.3d at 594.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 595 (Wright, J., dissenting).
177. See id.
178. Id. at 596 n.4 (quoting Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Heath, 497 U.S. 261,
296 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
179. See id. at 596.
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the American values of self-determination and privacy re-
garding personal decisions."
C
Although losing parties in the courts of appeal often ask for a
rehearing en banc, it is rarely granted. In this case, however,
the Ninth Circuit granted the request on August 1, 1995,181
and heard oral argument before a panel of eleven judges on
October 26, 1995. By a vote of eight to three, the court reversed
the earlier panel's decision and found that the Washington
statute violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.'82
Judge Stephen Reinhardt, in a forty-six page opinion for the
majority, described Judge Rothstein's lower court opinion as
"extremely thoughtful."" Judge Noonan had gone out of his
way to declare absurd the lower court decision in favor of two
dead plaintiffs."M Judge Reinhardt drew the obvious parallel
to the Supreme Court's initial decision in Roe v. Wade,'85
where the original plaintiff was no longer pregnant, but the
Court recognized that other women would become pregnant.'s
A case is not mooted when the controversy is capable of repeti-
tion, yet evading review. The fact that two of the original
plaintiffs had died before the case came to trial did not matter;
the issue they raised remained important because other people
would also suffer end-of-life crises, and they, too, might die
before their cases could come to trial.
The important thing about the Ninth Circuit's opinion is that
Judge Reinhardt decided to focus his opinion entirely on the
Due Process Clause, and therefore did not feel it was necessary
180. Id. (quoting Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891)). Judge
Wright also agreed with the lower court in its analysis of the proper standard of re-
view as well as the equal protection claim. See id. at 596-97.
181. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995) [here-
inafter Compassion in Dying III].
182. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) [here-
inafter Compassion in Dying IV].
183. Id. at 797.
184. See Compassion in Dying II, 49 F.3d at 590-91.
185. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
186. See Compassion in Dying IV, 79 F.3d at 796 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 125 (1973)).
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to deal with the equal protection analysis. Although he fleshed
out his argument with copious references, Judge Reinhardt
made it clear from the start that he believed the Constitution
protected a right to die;"' he then phrased the question as
whether "prohibiting physicians from prescribing life-ending
medication for use by terminally ill patients who wish to die
violates the patients' due process rights."" While recognizing
that, as in all liberty interests, a balancing was required be-
tween the rights of the individual and the legitimate interests
of the state, the larger panel, unlike Judge Noonan, would im-
pose more than the simple rational basis test.
The court quickly found that a liberty interest existed, and
like Judge Rothstein, the panel found "compelling similarities
between right-to-die cases and abortion cases."8 ' The majority
went further than the district court, however, in noting that the
balancing test might yield different outcomes at different points
along the life cycle. In Roe, the Court had utilized a trimester
arrangement, in which the woman's interests and choices were
paramount in the first trimester, while the state's interests took
precedence in the last trimester. So, in determining end-of-life
decisions, the majority held differing circumstances could dic-
tate differing outcomes, directly repudiating Judge Noonan's
reductio ad absurdum.190
The key to the panel's analysis is that Judge Reinhardt, at
all times, focused on what he considered the larger liberty in-
terest; namely, the right to die, which had already been articu-
lated by the Supreme Court in Cruzan. Judge Noonan, by de-
fining the alleged liberty interest only as a right to assisted
death, could ignore the larger issue, and in doing so he could
dismiss much of the district court's analysis. Judge Reinhardt's
approach was more encompassing.
We do not ask simply whether there is a liberty interest in
receiving "aid in killing oneself' because such a narrow
interest could not exist in the absence of a broader and
more important underlying interest-the right to die. In
187. See id. at 798-99.
188. Id. at 799.
189. Id. at 800.
190. See Compassion in Dying I, 49 F.3d at 590-91.
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short, it is the end and not the means that defines the
liberty interest.19'
Once the court framed the argument in these terms, and
with a majority believing that the "larger" issue constituted the
right to die, all that remained was to formulate the liberty
interest, identify an appropriate standard of review, and then
examine Washington's prohibition on assisting suicide in light
of that standard. The Ninth Circuit, however, went further in
its expansive reading of what substantive due process meant. It
began with Justice John Marshall Harlan's dissent in Poe v.
Ullman,"2 in which he argued that "the full scope of the lib-
erty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause is... a rational
continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all
substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless re-
straints . . .".9 3 In his dissent, Justice Harlan had hinted that
some liberty interests are weightier than others and, according
to Judge Reinhardt, the Supreme Court appeared to be "head-
ing towards the formal adoption of the continuum approach,
along with a balancing test, in substantive due process cases
generally."'94 The problem then became determining what cri-
teria courts would use in defining the scope of the continuum
and in enumerating the values found along it.
Again responding to Judge Noonan's decision, Judge
Reinhardt indicated that history and tradition could play only a
limited role in such judgments. Times changed and "[w]ere his-
tory our sole guide, the Virginia anti-miscegenation statute that
the Court overturned in the 1967 case of Loving v. Virginia,'95
as violative of substantive due process and the Equal Protection
Clause, would still be in force because such anti-miscegenation
laws were commonplace both when the United States was
founded and when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopt-
ed."'96 Moreover, according to Judge Reinhardt, the Supreme
Court itself had "reject[ed] the view that substantive due pro-
191. Compassion in Dying IV, 79 F.3d at 801.
192. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
193. Id. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting from dismissal on jurisdictional grounds).
194. Compassion in Dying IV, 79 F.3d at 804.
195. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
196. Compassion in Dying IV, 79 F.3d at 805 (citation omitted).
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cess protects rights or liberties only if they possess a historical
pedigree."197
Judge Reinhardt then went into an analysis of historical
attitudes toward suicide and the changes that had taken place,
citing polls showing that a large majority of Americans en-
dorsed recent legal decisions granting terminally ill patients the
right to terminate treatment. He also discussed a variety of
books and articles, as well as examples of people who had tak-
en their own life. 9'
The analysis of the liberty interest under both Casey and
Cruzan generally followed the outline of the lower court,"
but with the difference that, after finding the liberty interest,
Judge Reinhardt did not dismiss the state's concerns as easily
as Judge Rothstein had done. Judge Reinhardt identified six
important state interests: (1) the state's general interest in pre-
serving life; (2) the more specific interest in preventing suicide;
(3) avoiding involvement of third parties in the decision, and
precluding arbitrary, unfair or undue influence; (4) protecting
family members and loved ones; (5) protecting the integrity of
the medical profession; and (6) avoiding adverse consequences
that might ensue if the statute were found unconstitutional.2°
The difference in wording from Judge Noonan's list is in-
structive. Judge Noonan apparently started with an assumption
that if a right to die existed, under Cruzan it was limited and
had to take a secondary role to the state's interests. His balanc-
ing is not a balancing at all, but a simple rational basis test.
Judge Reinhardt starts with the assumption that the right to
die is an important liberty interest, fully protected by substan-
tive due process, and while there is a continuum, the
individual's rights are presumed to trump those of the state,
absent some compelling reason. In his analysis of the six state
interests, as balanced against those of the individual, Judge
Reinhardt found no such reason.20' Judge Reinhardt did not
declare that the state could not regulate physician-assisted
197. Id. at 806 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847-48 (1992)).
198. See id. at 810-12.
199. See id. at 812-16.
200. See id. at 830-32.
201. See fd. at 817-32.
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suicide or that it might not establish procedures to limit that
choice to a particular group of people, but he found that the
total ban as embodied in the state statute went too far. "By
adopting appropriate, reasonable, and properly drawn safe-
guards Washington could ensure that people who choose to
have their doctors prescribe lethal doses of medication are truly
competent and meet all requisite standards."2 °2
There was one final point in Judge Noonan's opinion that
Judge Reinhardt chose to answer, and that was the call for
judicial restraint, the charge that courts should not be involved
in this sort of policy-making. Judge Reinhardt agreed that mat-
ters involving life and death should not be made by courts. He
then stood the argument on its head by declaring that
by permitting the individual to exercise the right to choose
we are following the constitutional mandate to take such
decisions out of the hands of the government, both state
and federal, and to put them where they rightly belong, in
the hands of the people. We are allowing people to make
the decisions that so profoundly affect their very exis-
tence-and precluding the state from intruding excessively
into that critical realm.0 '
The decision did not force anyone to commit suicide.
Those who believe strongly that death must come without
physician assistance are free to follow that creed, be they
doctors or patients. They are not free, however, to force
their views, their religious convictions, or their philosophies
on all the other members of a democratic society, and to
compel those whose values differ with theirs to die painful,
protracted and agonizing deaths.'
There were three dissents from the majority opinion. Judge
Robert R. Beezer believed that terminally ill patients did not
have a fundamental right to physician-assisted suicide, because
such a right was neither deeply "rooted in the nation's history"
nor implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.2 5 His dissent
202. See id. at 833.
203. Id. at 839 (emphasis added).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 848-49 (Beezer, J., dissenting).
3591998]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:313
rejected the majority notion that Casey supported the creation
of a right to assisted suicide in any manner. In any case, he ex-
plained, abortion rights were no longer fundamental after
Casey, and thus inapplicable to termination of a viable life.2°
Since the asserted liberty interest was not fundamental, a ra-
tional basis standard would be acceptable, although Judge
Beezer believed that the law would survive strict scrutiny as
well. °7 Similarly, he thought the equal protection argument
could also be measured on a rational basis, because the plain-
tiffs' challenge involved neither a fundamental right nor a sus-
pect classification."' Judges Ferdinand F. Fernandez and An-
drew J. Kleinfeld joined Beezer's dissent, but each added a
reservation. Judge Fernandez stated that nothing in either the
majority or the minority opinions convinced him that there was
any constitutional right to suicide, and he believed end-of-life
choices ought to be left to the legislature, and not the courts, to
decide.2" Judge Kleinfeld also doubted there was any constitu-
tional right to suicide, and he thought that there was a clear
difference between withdrawing from treatment and actively
overdosing on lethal drugs.21
IV
A
On the East Coast, Dr. Timothy Quill, the doctor who had
leaped into national prominence with his admission that he had
helped one of his patients commit suicide,"' launched a legal
attack against the law under which local prosecutors had tried
to indict him.212 In July, 1994, Quill, along with two other
206. See id.
207. See id. at 851.
208. See id. at 856.
209. See id. at 857 (Fernandez, J., dissenting).
210. See id. at 857-58 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
211. See sources cited supra note 95.
212. See Quill v. Koppel, 870 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). The doctors' decision to
file the suit may have been triggered by the report of a special panel, the New York
State Task Force on Life and the Law, which on May 25, 1994, issued its long-await-
ed report on physician-assisted suicide. The influential advisory panel unanimously
recommended that the state not legalize physician-assisted suicide for the terminally
ill. The report argued that such a step would benefit only a few people but would
open the door to widespread abuse. The panel expressed concern that doctors, instead
of trying to improve the relatively poor medical care dying patients receive, might
tend to prescribe lethal drugs as an easier treatment. See New York State Task
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doctors, Samuel C. Klagsbrun and Howard A. Grossman,
brought suit in the Southern District of New York to have New
York's ban on assisted suicide declared unconstitutional. Three
terminally ill patients also were plaintiffs, but all of them died
before the case went to trial, leaving only the physicians.213
In his declaration, Quill explained that, due to the criminal
investigation following the death of his patient, he was afraid
to provide other terminally ill patients with barbiturates for
fear of violating the criminal law. This fear was substantiated
by the other two doctors as well. They sought an injunction to
bar enforcement of those portions of the New York Penal Code
which made assisting suicide a second-degree felony (man-
slaughter).214 The state asserted that no actual case or contro-
versy existed, and therefore the suit was nonjusticiable.215 Al-
though Chief Judge Thomas P. Griesa held that the action did
provide a justiciable controversy, he went on to rule that pa-
tients did not have any fundamental right to physician-assisted
suicide, and that the state laws criminalizing assisted suicide
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.16
The first issue, that of justiciability, might not have arisen
had any of the original patient plaintiffs lived long enough, but
unlike Judge Rothstein, Chief Judge Griesa did not keep them
listed as plaintiffs, nor did he invoke the "capable of repetition
yet evading review" rationale used in the Ninth Circuit. The
state argued that the doctors had no standing because they
could not show more than a speculative possibility of
prosecution." 7 Chief Judge Griesa found this to be an easy
question, since the Supreme Court had held in a number of
cases that when challenging the constitutionality of a criminal
Force on Life and the Law, WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT: ASSISTED SUICmE AND EUTHA-
NASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT (1994).
213. Quill, 870 F. Supp. at 79.
214. The New York Penal Code Section 125.15(3) provides that "a person is guilty
of manslaughter in the second degree when . . . he intentionally ... aids another
person to commit suicide." N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.15(3) (McKinney 1965). Section
120.30 provides that "[a] person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he
intentionally . . . aids another person to attempt suicide." Id. § 120.30.
215. See Quill, 870 F. Supp. at 81.
216. See id. at 78.
217. See id. at 81.
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statute, the plaintiff need not expose himself to actual prosecu-
tion.2
18
On the second question, Chief Judge Griesa agreed that un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment, "there are certain subjects
which are so fundamental to personal liberty that governmental
invasion is either entirely prohibited or sharply limited."219
Like the judges in the Ninth Circuit, he too found a supporting
statement in Casey about due process protecting "the most
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a life-
time." "° Chief Judge Griesa, however, was unwilling to draw
the analogy between the "intimate and personal choices" relat-
ing to abortion and those made at the end of life."' He found
the Supreme Court's ruling in Cruzan less than enlightening,
believing that "the Court stopped short of actually deciding that
there is a constitutional right to terminate medical treatment
necessary to sustain life, although the Court assumed the exis-
tence of such a right for the purpose of going on to the other
issues in the case."222
Since the plaintiffs read Roe, Casey and Cruzan as embody-
ing a due process protection of all intimate and personal choic-
es, they believed such protection should cover whether a person
wanted to end her own life, certainly one of the most intimate
and personal of all choices. This, according to the court, was
where the plaintiffs had erred. "Plaintiffs' reading of these cases
is too broad."2  Moreover, there has been no historic recogni-
tion of any right to physician-assisted suicide, even in the case
of terminally ill patients. Suicide was long considered a crime
in its own right, and a majority of states had long imposed
penalties on those who aided others to kill themselves. Even
the Model Penal Code, which embodies the most enlightened
thought, makes it a crime to assist a suicide.' As far as the
court was concerned, even the very limited form of assisted
218. See id. (citing Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Natl Union, 442 U.S. 289
(1979); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973)).
219. Id. at 82.
220. Id. (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
221. See id.
222. Id. at 83 (emphasis in original).
223. Id.
224. See id. at 84 (citing to MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5(2)).
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suicide advocated by the plaintiffs, helping terminally ill people
end their suffering, could hardly be characterized as a liberty
interest protected under the Fourteenth Amendment.2"
The three doctors also put forward an equal protection argu-
ment; namely, that people who wanted to end their suffering
through active euthanasia were not treated equally as those
already on life sustaining treatment, whom the law allowed to
terminate that treatment."6 Chief Judge Griesa made short
shrift of that argument as well. Did the distinction drawn by
the legislature between the two classes have a reasonable and
rational basis? He admitted that some people would see little or
no difference, while others would see a great difference. "In any
event, it is hardly unreasonable or irrational for the State to
recognize a difference between allowing nature to take its
course, even in the most severe situations, and intentionally
using an artificial death-producing device."22 ' The state had
obvious interests in preserving life and protecting vulnerable
persons, and under the Constitution, in the absence of an iden-
tifiable individual right, the state had the discretion over what
way it chose to protect these interests. Chief Judge Griesa then
granted summary judgment.2"
B
The New York decision came down seven months after Judge
Rothstein decided the Washington case, and only a week after
the latter case had been argued before the three-judge panel of
the Ninth Circuit. Yet, the New York case did not draw as
much attention as the Washington case, and the decision men-
tions no amici briefs filed on either side. This situation changed
dramatically when the Second Circuit heard argument on the
case at the beginning of September, 1995, and a significant
number of groups, many of whom had also filed in the Ninth
Circuit, now joined the fray on the East Coast.2" The case
was heard before Judges Roger J. Miner, Guido Calabresi, and
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. Id&
228. See id. at 85.
229. See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 718 (2d Cir. 1996) (listing amici briefs). The
name of the case also changed, after Dennis C. Vacco replaced G. Oliver Koppel as
Attorney General of New York. See id. at 716.
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Milton Pollack, a senior district judge from the Southern Dis-
trict of New York sitting by designation. Judge Miner wrote the
opinion for a unanimous panel.
One could immediately sense where Miner was heading by
his statement of the background. Where Chief Judge Griesa
merely had mentioned that the three patient-plaintiffs died
before the trial began, Judge Miner quoted extensively from
their declarations, in which they detailed their illnesses and the
pain and suffering they endured. ° Unlike Chief Judge
Griesa, he entered sections of the physicians' declarations, and
the problems they confronted in treating terminally ill pa-
tients. 1
Like the lower court, the Second Circuit rejected the state's
claim that no justiciable issue existed. Judge Miner referred not
only to Babbitt v. United Farm Workers National Union 2 and
Doe v. Bolton," but took judicial notice that an attempt had
been made to indict Dr. Quill after he acknowledged helping a
patient end her life. Although New York County District Attor-
ney Robert M. Morganthau (also named as a defendant) had
claimed that the plaintiffs had not shown that they were in any
jeopardy, Judge Miner quoted from a newspaper clipping report-
ing that Morgenthau had announced a grand jury indictment of
George Delury on manslaughter charges for helping his wife
commit suicide the previous summer. "The physician plaintiffs,"
Judge Miner concluded, "have good reason to fear prosecution
in New York County." 4
The court then began its inquiry into whether assisted sui-
cide qualified as a fundamental liberty interest. "Rights that
have no textual support in the language of the Constitution but
qualify for heightened judicial protection include fundamental
liberties so 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' that 'nei-
ther liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed." 5
While the Supreme Court counted privacy among the rights
230. See id. at 720-21.
231. See id. 721.
232. 442 U.S. 289 (1979).
233. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
234. Quill, 80 F.3d at 723 (citing N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1995, at Bi).
235. Id. (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)).
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protected by due process, it had been reluctant to expand the
meaning of privacy, and had given lower courts tenuous guide-
lines on how to proceed. That line, "albeit a shaky one," could
be found in Bowers v. Hardwick, 6 where the high court had
held there was no "fundamental right to engage in consensual
sodomy ... [since] the statutes proscribing such conduct had
'ancient roots.'"" Taking its cue from that case, the appellate
court declined to define physician-assisted suicide as a right
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. As in Bowers, no
historical justification existed to make it so; "[i]ndeed, the very
opposite is true. The Common Law of England, as received by
the American colonies, prohibited suicide and attempted sui-
cide.... Clearly, no 'right' to assisted suicide has ever been
recognized in the United States.""8 The court explained that,
if the Supreme Court was hesitant to expand due process
rights, then "[o]ur position in the judicial hierarchy constrains
us to be even more reluctant than the Court to undertake an
expansive approach in this uncharted area." 9
Such restraint, however, seemed to evaporate as the court
turned to plaintiffs' other argument, that a denial of physician-
assisted suicide violated the Equal Protection Clause. Seeking
an appropriate level of review, the court reviewed those types of
legislation that called for rational basis (matters of social wel-
fare and economics), intermediate scrutiny (gender and illegiti-
macy), and strict scrutiny (involving suspect classes).2" The
court then concluded that the prohibition against physician-
assisted suicide fell into the class of social welfare and could be
examined under a rational basis test."
One might speculate that the appellate court took this route
to avoid the perception that it was creating a new right or
expanding an existing one. By treating the statute as a form of
social welfare regulation, it could apply the lowest form of re-
view and find that it made no rational sense to distinguish be-
tween allowing people to terminate treatment to hasten deaths
236. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
237. Quill, 80 F.3d at 724 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192 (1986)).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 725.
240. See id. at 726.
241. See id. at 727.
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and allowing people to hasten death by other means. In 1987,
the New York legislature had specifically amended its laws to
allow citizens to refuse treatment and to direct doctors and
hospitals not to resuscitate should they go into cardiac ar-
rest.242 Three years later, the state provided for health care
proxies, empowering such proxies to terminate treatment for
comatose patients.m
After reviewing the Supreme Court's holding in Cruzan,
Judge Miner concluded:
[I]t seems clear that New York does not treat similarly cir-
cumstanced people alike: those in the final stages of termi-
nal illness who are on life-support systems are allowed to
hasten their deaths by directing the removal of such sys-
tems, but those who are similarly situated, except for the
previous attachment of life-sustaining equipment, are not
allowed to hasten death by self-administering prescribed
drugs. 2
4
As far as the court was concerned, there seemed little differ-
ence between assisted suicide and the withholding or withdraw-
al of treatment.
Having found unequal treatment, the court had to determine
whether there was a rational basis for establishing such in-
equality. At oral argument, the state had argued that its "prin-
cipal interest is in preserving the life of all its citizens at all
times and under all conditions," to which Miner responded:
But what interest can the state possibly have in requiring
the prolongation of a life that is all but ended? Surely, the
state's interest lessens as the potential for life diminish-
es .... And what business is it of the state to require the
continuation of agony when the result is imminent and
inevitable? What concern prompts the state to interfere
with a mentally competent patient's "right to define [his]
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and
of the mystery of human life," when the patient seeks to
have drugs prescribed to end life during the final stages of
a terminal illness? The greatly reduced interest of the state
242. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2960-79 (McKinney 1993).
243. See id. §§ 2980-94.
244. Quill, 80 F.3d at 729.
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in preserving life compels the answer to these questions:
"None."'
In conclusion, the court found that New York statutes
criminalizing assisted suicide violated the Equal Protection
Clause, because preventing a doctor from prescribing drugs to a
mentally competent patient bore no rational relationship to any
legitimate state interest."5
Judge Guido Calabresi concurred in the judgment-that the
laws as written should be struck down-but he entered a sepa-
rate opinion because he believed it was premature to reach
either the due process or equal protection analysis regarding
the larger question of whether all laws prohibiting assisted
suicide might fail." ' Judge Calabresi began with a lengthy
analysis of English and New York laws on suicide and assisted
suicide and concluded that "the bases of these statutes have
been deeply eroded over the last hundred and fifty years;
and... few of their foundations remain in place today."24 As
he read the history, the original reason for the statutes was to
criminalize other conduct that at the time had itself been pro-
hibited, suicide and attempted suicide. Since then, at least one
form of suicide had become legally recognizable, the withdrawal
of life-sustaining treatment, and one could find little distinction
between that conduct and the taking of prescribed drugs to end
life. The legislature, faced by these changing conditions, had not
acted affirmatively to reassert the state's policy while, at the
same time, the older laws were unenforced. 9
Normally, this would not make much difference, since
[wle regularly uphold laws whose original reason has van-
ished, whose fit with the rest of the legal system is dubi-
ous, whose enforcement is virtually nil, and whose contin-
ued presence on the books seems as much due to the strong
245. Id. at 729-30 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992)). Judge Miner had read the initial decision of the three-judge panel of the
Ninth Circuit and briefly noted its elucidation of state interests, but he found none of
them compelling. See id. at 730-31.
246. See id. at 731.
247. See id. at 731-32 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
248. Id. at 735.
249. See id.
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inertial force that the framers of our constitutions gave to
the status quo as to any current majoritarian support."0
When fundamental, substantive rights are in danger, however,
there is also "a long tradition of constitutional holdings that
inertia will not do." "m The answer, Judge Calabresi believed,
lay in notifying legislatures of the potential unconstitutionality
of a particular statute. The legislature should then have the
opportunity either to reaffirm the law and face the constitution-
al test, abandon the requirement, or amend the statute to cure
it of perceived defects. This could be done in a variety of ways.
One was to nullify the law, as had been done here, but he
would add an invitation to the legislature to reconsider the
matter. This approach, he believed, was not only a better way
for courts to handle matters of such far-reaching import, but
also had precedents in the Supreme Court.2 On a number of
occasions, the Justices had struck down particular laws or ad-
ministrative regulations but had invited the Congress or an
agency to rethink and revise the rule.2" Judge Calabresi be-
lieved this law of nineteenth-century origins to be of doubtful
validity and joined the majority in striking it down. He did so,
however, in what he described as "a constitutional remand7'
and noted specifically that he had not dealt with the merits of
the plaintiffs' case; that, he urged, should wait until New
York's legislature had acted.255
V
A
While advocates for particular interest groups, such as the
Hemlock Society and the American Civil Liberties Union,
cheered the decisions in the Second and Ninth Circuits, legal
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. See id. at 735-38.
253. See id. at 738-40 (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988);
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959);
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116
(1958); Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800 (D. Conn. 1972)). Judge Calabresi had
written extensively on how courts should deal with questionable statutes. See GUIDO
CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
254. See Quill, 80 F.3d at 738.
255. See id. at 743.
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commentators proved considerably more hostile. Susan R.
Martyn and Henry J. Bourguignon attacked what they consid-
ered the "lethal flaws" in the Second and Ninth Circuit opin-
ions." According to Martyn and Bourguignon, the two opin-
ions "mark a decisive turning point in American law that must
not pass unnoticed or unchallenged."257 They considered the
line drawn by the courts to be untenable and stated that "the
sole purpose of this Essay is to drive home the many compel-
ling reasons to maintain the traditional line between killing
and letting die." 8 As for the pain and suffering of terminally
ill patients who suffered unrelievable pain and voluntarily
sought a doctor's help to end their lives, they explained that
"we must continue to treat these rare cases, however, as tragic,
isolated occurrences." 9 Above all, the slippery slope running
perilously near the surface in the two decisions had to be avoid-
ed, lest Americans repeat the same tragic pattern of events that
led to euthanasia in the Netherlands.2"
An article in the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law
Review took a different tack, asserting that the courts had
erred in limiting the right to the terminally ill.2 ' If a liberty
interest existed, then bans on doctor-assisted suicide ought to
be unconstitutional as applied not only to terminally ill patients
but to others as well. "The case for the balance tipping in favor
of the individual is clearest with respect to those who are in-
curably in pain or have an ailment that portends imminent
death."262 Here, the individual liberty interest clearly trumped
any state interests in protecting life and regulating the medical
profession.
256. See Susan R. Martyn & Henry J. Bourguignon, Physician-Assisted Suicide: The
Lethal Flaws in the Ninth and Second Circuit Decisions, 85 CAL. L. REV. 371 (1997).
257. Id. at 373.
258. Id. at 374, 385-90.
259. Id. at 375.
260. See, e.g., Margaret P. Miller, Boot-Strapping Down a Slippery Slope in the
Second and Ninth Circuits: Compassion in Dying is Neither Compassionate nor Con-
stitutional, 30 CREIGHTON L. REv. 833 (1997).
261. See Rachel D. Kleinberg & Toshiro M. Mochizuld, The Final Freedom: Main-
taining Autonomy and Valuing Life in Physician-Assisted Suicide Cases, 32 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 197 (1997).
262. Id. at 219.
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What about nonterminally ill individuals? If a liberty interest
exists that allows one category of people to end their lives, why
should it be restricted to just that class? The authors believe an
equal protection analysis would support their argument that
the right has to be broader. If a person suffered from terrible
pain that could not be medically alleviated, but that person was
not terminally ill, why should she have to suffer with no hope
of release except through a death that might be years away?
The notion that people who have years to live face many op-
tions for a fruitful life is not convincing to a bedridden man
who cannot even get up to walk to the bathroom. There is little
difference between allowing a person who might have years to
live if she stayed on dialysis to stop that treatment and die,
and a person not on such a regimen who suffered from a debili-
tating, painful, but nonfatal disease to choose death."
The state could adopt selective restrictions in which state
interests would be considered greater than those of the individ-
ual. This would be especially true in cases of minors and other
legal incompetents, to prevent undue influence, and in those
cases where the would-be suicide had minor dependents. The
state also could authorize who might assist in suicides, perhaps
limiting it to just physicians, and ensure that the choice is
informed and made freely.2"
Perhaps the most sustained and reasoned attack on the deci-
sions came from Chicago Law School Professor Cass R.
Sunstein, who argued that the Supreme Court should not in-
validate state laws prohibiting physician-assisted suicide.2"
Sunstein's argument has less to do with the morality of the
issue but instead focuses on the institutional dynamics of a
democracy attempting to deal with a difficult problem. Even if
a case could be made out for a liberty interest and physician-
assisted suicide qualified as fundamental under the Due Pro-
cess Clause, the bans could still be upheld on the grounds of
the state's paramount interests. "The Court should reach this
conclusion partly because of appropriate judicial modesty in the
263. See id. at 220.
264. See id. at 221-22. For a more elaborate "calculus" on whether the state should
allow certain individuals to commit suicide, see TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F.
CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 67-119 (3d ed. 1989).
265. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Die, 106 YALE L. J. 1123 (1997).
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face of difficult underlying questions of value and fact; it should
emphasize these institutional concerns in explaining its con-
clusion." "2  The gist of Sunstein's essay is that the courts
should not short-circuit the democratic process. The question of
physician-assisted suicide was not languishing due to popular
indifference; to the contrary, intense discussion was occurring in
the states, and, in at least three states, the issue had been put
to a popular referendum. Moreover, many cases involving so-
called fundamental rights, including the cases on privacy and
equal protection, "are best seen not as flat declarations that the
state interest was inadequate to justify the state's intrusion,
but more narrowly as democracy-forcing outcomes designed to
overcome problems of discrimination and desuetude."267 That
situation did not exist here.
In fact, there were practically no law review articles praising
the circuit court decisions.2" Everyone expected the issue to
go up to the Supreme Court, and given the reluctance of the
Rehnquist Court to expand rights under either Due Process or
Equal Protection, hardly anyone expected the appeals courts'
decisions to survive. Moreover, even if one agreed with the
notion that terminally ill patients ought to be able to end their
lives, this did not mean that such a right existed or that it
could be found in the Constitution.
Shortly after the Supreme Court had accepted the Washing-
ton and New York cases for review, Yale Professor Stephen L.
Carter published an article in The New York Times Magazine
urging the courts not to, as he put it, "rush to lethal judg-
ment." 9 Carter sees the controversy over assisted suicide pri-
marily as a moral debate and feels that "[e]xcept in emergen-
cies, a court decision is the worst way to resolve a moral dilem-
ma."70 If the courts decided this question, it would preempt a
moral debate that was just beginning; the courts should stay
out of the issue and let the questions "be answered through
266. Id. at 1124.
267. Id.
268. For the lone voice in support of the decisions, see Tom L. Beauchamp, The
Justification of Physician-Assisted Deaths, 29 IND. L. REV. 1173 (1996).
269. Stephen L. Carter, Rush to Lethal Judgment, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 21, 1996,
at 28.
270. Id. at 29.
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popular debate and perhaps legislation, not through legal briefs
and litigation.2 71
Carter believes that the judiciary had become involved too
early and that there had not yet been a significant, popular
debate on the question. I would suggest, however, that by the
time the courts of appeal heard these cases, popular debate had
been going on for a number of years. Public opinion polls, popu-
lar referenda, books, articles in lay and scholarly journals and
discussions on talk shows have made the question one that
many Americans have thought about. The debate is far from
over, but given the fact that, as de Tocqueville noted many
years ago, "scarcely any political question arises in the United
States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial ques-
tion,"72 it is neither surprising nor disturbing that assisted
suicide has wound its way through the judicial labyrinth to the
marble palace.
B
In recent years, the Supreme Court has been fairly stingy in
granting certiorari. Regarding assisted suicide, two circuits
disagreed on the rationale for their findings, and not on wheth-
er a right to physician-assisted suicide existed. Nonetheless, the
Court granted certiorari to both cases at the beginning of the
October 1996 Term. 3
The Court scheduled oral arguments on January 8, 1997,
and, well before dawn, protesters and people seeking tickets to
hear the arguments gathered on the steps of the marble palace.
Diane Coleman, the founder of a group called Not Dead Yet,
showed up in her wheelchair to protest the whole notion of
physician-assisted suicide, while members of the Hemlock Soci-
ety, which supports voluntary euthanasia, carried their banner
nearby." Bob Castagna, the executive director of the Oregon
Catholic Conference, asked "[w]ill nature take its course, or will
271. Id.
272. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 290 (Phillips Bradley ed.,
1945).
273. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2302 (1996); Vacco v. Quill, 117 S.
Ct. 2293 (1996).
274. See Laura Blumenfeld, At Dawn, Activists Greet Matters of Death in Shades of
Gray, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 1997, at Al.
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we turn doctors into angels of death?"275 Many of those in line
had more complex responses to reporters' questions. Doris
Kuehn's father had been a strong right-to-die proponent, and he
had lost a lung and seven ribs because of tuberculosis. "I'm
more pro than con," he said, "but you can't pin it down. Does it
have to be severe pain, or is it just a feeling that I want to
die? I know there are gray areas."276
At ten o'clock, the marshal called out the traditional "Oyez,
oyez," and the nine Justices filed in through the curtain to take
their seats. Chief Justice Rehnquist called on Senior Assistant
Attorney General for the State of Washington, William L. Wil-
liams, to defend the Washington statute. Williams declared,
We are here today representing the people of the State of
Washington to defend their legislative policy judgment to
prohibit assisted suicide.... The issue here today is
whether the Constitution requires that the social policy
developed by Washington voters must be supplanted by a
far different social policy, a constitutionally recognized right
to physician-assisted suicide that is contrary to our tradi-
tions ......
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg began the questioning by noting
that the Court's ruling in Cruzan recognized a liberty interest
even while acknowledging the right of the state to regulate it.
Why could not the Court do the same thing in this
case-recognize a liberty interest and then give the states lee-
way to regulate it? Williams responded that recognizing a liber-
ty interest would greatly limit the states' ability to regulate the
problem. If the Court, however, did find a liberty interest, he
believed the states' interests here were as strong as those the
Court had recognized in Cruzan.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wanted to know what the
state's interests would be if the Court decided to recognize a
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Excerpts from the Supreme Court Arguments on Physician-Assisted Suicide,
WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 1997, at A16 (alterations in original) [hereinafter Excerpts]. For
a discussion of oral arguments, see also Arguments Before the Court, 65 U.S.L.W.
3481 (Jan. 14, 1997); Linda Greenhouse, High Court Hears 2 Cases Involving Assisted
Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1997, at Al.
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liberty interest in assisted suicide. Williams responded that the
states were beginning to reassess where a line should be
drawn, but that clearly the highest priority remained preserv-
ing life and preventing suicide; other important interests includ-
ed prevention of abuse and undue influence, as well as regula-
tion of the medical profession to protect patients."8
The Chief Justice asked whether "it would be very difficult to
assume a liberty interest and rule in your favor in this case,
would it not? Because if we assume a liberty interest but none-
theless say that, even assuming a liberty interest, a state can
prohibit it entirely, that would be rather a conundrum."27 '
Williams disagreed, trying to argue that the states' interests
here were similar to those in Cruzan, but Chief Justice
Rehnquist cut him off. In Cruzan, the Court had dealt only
with an evidentiary rule; here, Washington wanted an outright
prohibition.
Williams got no further than saying, "That's correct," when
Justice Antonin Scalia broke in. Declaring a liberty interest
would be cost-free, he wanted to know if Williams immediately
could say it would be outweighed by the various social policies
adopted by the states. Williams conceded that, but noted that
in Oregon Employment Security Division v. Smith,' the
Court had supported an absolute ban on the use of peyote in
the face of an even stronger individual interest-the First
Amendment right to free exercise of religion.2"'
The state contended that allowing assisted suicide to the
terminally ill who wanted to end their lives raised the risk that
the practice would expand to include those who did not want to
hasten their deaths, as well as to those who were not terminal-
ly ill. Justice David Souter asked a number of questions,
wanting to know how realistic those fears were. "It's a plausible
argument," he declared, "but how realistic is it? What method
should I use [in evaluating the risk]? What basis is there to
evaluate the claim that slippage will occur?" 2
278. See Excerpts, supra note 277, at A16.
279. Id.
280. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
281. See Excerpts, supra note 277, at A16.
282. Arguments Before the Court, 65 U.S.L.W. 3481 (Jan. 14, 1997) [hereinafter
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Williams conceded that no empirical evidence existed in the
American experience to assess the risk, but studies of the Neth-
erlands indicated that acceptance of physician-assisted suicide
had led to instances of involuntary euthanasia. Moreover, while
proponents here claimed they wanted physician-assisted suicide
in only a narrow class, he feared that if they won these cases
the next time around they would seek assisted suicide for a
broader range of people and not just for the terminally ill."
Justice John Paul Stevens wanted to know whether states
had the legislative authority to approve assisted suicide, and
Williams agreed that they did. In response to a similar question
on state power from Justice Anthony Kennedy, Williams noted
that "if you accept a rational basis level of review, states have
the maximum flexibility to decide [the issue] on a state-by-state
basis."'
Where did one draw the line in actual practice, Justice
Stevens asked. He knew of no instances where a doctor had
been convicted for giving assistance in a suicide. Williams ad-
mitted he, too, knew of no convictions. "But... if one as-
sumes that there is a covert practice going on under current
law and [as] the line gets muddier, the potential for abuse is
much worse." 5
Williams then surrendered the balance of his time to Acting
United States Solicitor General Walter Dellinger, since the
United States had filed an amicus brief on behalf of the states.
Justice O'Connor immediately asked him how one could recon-
cile the government's position that a liberty interest existed but
that the Washington state law should be upheld.
Dellinger responded that the interest involved was not a
liberty interest in dying, but in avoiding severe pain for which
state law prevented certain patients from obtaining relief.
While important, this did not rise to the level of a fundamental
liberty interest such as the Court had found in Cruzan; namely,
that the state cannot compel a person to continue unwanted
medical treatment. "If the state is the only thing standing be-
Arguments).
283. Id.
284. Id. (alterations in original).
285. Id. at 3482.
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tween you and pain relief," Dellinger said, "we think the person
has a cognizable interest."' But while "the individual stories
[in appellants' briefs] are heartrending,... it's important for
this court to recognize that, if you were to affirm the judgments
below, lethal medication could be proposed as a treatment, not
just to those in severe pain, but to every competent terminally
ill person.., in the country."" 7
Justice Scalia then asserted that Dellinger's response had
nothing to do with suicide, nor with prohibitions against it.
"[W]hat's critical," Dellinger argued, "is ... if you affirm the
judgments below, lethal medications could be prescribed as
treatment for anyone."m
"Now or ever," Justice Ginsburg interjected, "the case raises
the basic issue of who decides. Is it ever a proper question for
courts as opposed to the legislature to decide?" 9
Before Dellinger could answer, Justice Souter suggested that
"[m]aybe the Court should wait until it can know more [about
the actual risks]." 9'
Some studies exist, Dellinger answered, which show it is
possible to set up safeguards, "but the reality is that they can't
be met all the time."29' In an ominous final comment, he not-
ed that in a health care system attempting to treat pain and
depression, lethal medication is the least costly treatment."'
Kathryn L. Tucker of Seattle then rose to argue on behalf of
the doctors and patients who had brought the suit. For her
clients, the basic issue in the case was whether patients on the
threshold of death have a right to choose to end their lives with
dignity.
286. Id.
287. See Excerpts, supra note 277, at A16.
288. Arguments, supra note 282, at 3482.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. See id.
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Before she could go any further, Justice Scalia wanted to
know why she would limit the right to such a small group,
those "on the threshold," and why not to other patients, some of
whom may be in pain for years.29
Tucker responded that the only group for whom time is a
critical element are those on the threshold, whose only real
remaining choice is the manner of their imminent death. This
is a relatively easy determination for a doctor to make. A per-
son who still has potential for a fruitful life is not on that
threshold; he or she has other choices.2"
Justice Ginsburg wanted to know how Tucker would deal
with a person on the threshold of death whose pain was so
severe that she could not herself administer the lethal drug,
but would need a doctor's help.
Here, Tucker avoided a direct answer, because she knew that
the medical associations who opposed physician-assisted suicide
had hammered on the notion that doctors were supposed to
save lives, not become executioners. She conceded that the state
could impose a requirement of self-administration to ensure
voluntariness, which she termed essential. The state could even
impose a waiting period to ensure that the patient is making a
reasoned decision. "We want the Court to find a protected
right," she said, but also to allow experimentation on the state
level.29
5
Justices Rehnquist and Scalia then wanted Tucker to explain
the difference between a liberty interest in refusing or with-
drawing treatment and an interest in assisted suicide. In
Cruzan, according to the Chief Justice, the Court had affirmed
the right to refuse treatment which merely carried on a right
long embedded in common law. Rejecting treatment, Justice
Scalia interjected, is not the same as suicide. "Why can't society
decide as a matter of public morality that it's wrong to kill
yourself," just as it is wrong to kill another person?29
293. Id.
294. See id.
295. Id-
296 Id.
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Here, Tucker had a ready answer; namely, assisted suicide in
the circumstances of a terminally ill patient involves a very
personal decision. It deals with one's own body and health care,
not that of another person. The state may have a stronger
interest in preserving life early on in the course of a person's
illness, when that person still has a chance for a fruitful life.
The state's interest, however, grows weaker as the person nears
death, and it practically disappears when a person's only choice
is how to die-not whether to live or die. Moreover, the state is
inconsistent when it allows a person to make that choice in
other circumstances, such as through advance directives.297
As her time wound down, Tucker faced one final question
from Justice O'Connor about the ability of a person to refuse
life-sustaining treatment, such as kidney dialysis. When Tucker
responded that the state could intervene if that person had
suicidal tendencies, Justice Scalia commented that Tucker's
position would have to be broader than that if she truly wants
to leave decisions to individuals." s
It took only a few minutes for the attorneys from the Wash-
ington case to leave the counsel tables and for those who would
argue the New York case to take their place. The clerk then
called case number 95-1858, Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney General
of New York, et al. v. Timothy E. Quill et al. Chief Justice
Rehnquist invited Vacco to step up to the podium and be-
gin.299
Vacco began by asserting that the New York law did not
implicate any equal protection analysis because persons who
decline medical treatment are not similarly situated to those
who seek assistance in suicide." ° The key difference is that,
in withdrawal from treatment, death comes because of the
underlying illness or condition; in suicide, death comes from a
deliberately administered lethal drug.
297. See id.
298. See id.
299. For an article about Vacco, see Dan Barry, New York's Chief Lawyer Argues
Suicide Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1997, at B9. The Attorney General of Washington,
Christine 0. Gregoire, was in the courtroom, but had chosen to let one of her staff
members argue the case because Williams had spent years working on assisted sui-
cide and related issues.
300. See Arguments, supra note 282, at 3482.
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The legislature could draw the line where it wanted and, in
fact, could permit assisted suicide. "[W]e're here today to say
[that the legislature] shouldn't be constitutionally compelled [to
do so]."30' The legislature had decided, through the law cur-
rently in effect, that allowing physician-assisted suicide could
lead to euthanasia, a policy it did not want.0 2
Justice Stevens asked Vacco whether the state could totally
forbid the right to refuse treatment. "We'd be back here," Vacco
responded. He did not believe a legislature could constitutional-
ly forbid a dying person from refusing treatment.03
Justice Scalia then wanted to know whether a state could
authorize force-feeding for a person refusing treatment if that
person was not at death's door. "Why limit the discretion of the
legislature?"30' He also noted the not uncommon practice of
force-feeding a person who has gone on a hunger strike.
Vacco said he thought there was a big difference between
force-feeding a person and violation of a person's bodily integ-
rity through medication. This led the Chief Justice to note that
[ilt seems odd that bodily integrity is not violated by sticking a
spoon in your mouth but is by a needle in the arm."30 5
It all depends, Vacco responded, on whether a person's intent
is suicidal. While it was true that suicide was no longer a
crime in New York, barriers to it still existed. The state-erected
barriers were rational, and had the legitimate purpose of pre-
venting abuse.08
Justice Ginsburg asked the Attorney General to explain why
he thought the Second Circuit had erred.0 ' He responded that
the basic error lay in the lower court equating people on life-
support who wished to terminate that treatment and people not
on life-support who wished to end their lives. These two groups
are not similarly situated, and therefore an equal protection
analysis did not apply. But, Justice Ginsburg continued, the
301. Id.
302. See id.
303. See id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. See id.
307. See id. at 3483.
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results are the same; one turns off a machine and one dies, or
one takes a pill and one dies. The Attorney General insisted,
however, that there is a difference. "It's rationally distinguish-
able because it is consistent medical practice.... Providing
drugs specifically and solely for the purpose of killing someone
has never been embraced by the medical profession."
318
Next, Justice Souter engaged in a fairly lengthy exchange
with Vacco over the difference in giving medication for pain
relief that might, incidentally, lead to death, and giving the
same medication for the express purpose of causing death. To
justify this distinction, Justice Souter noted, one had to differ-
entiate between people on life-support, who had a right to end
treatment and therefore could be overmedicated to alleviate
pain, and those not on life-support. Isn't the line one of
abuse? °9
Vacco agreed. "The principal ... justification indeed, one of
the most compelling reasons, state interest, is the risk of
abuse."10 While there was also a risk of abuse in the treat-
ment of patients going off life-support, the state believed that
the risk of abuse is far greater for the terminally ill not on life-
support.3 '
Acting Solicitor General Dellinger then returned to the lec-
tern and, in a nutshell, summarized the essence of the Second
Circuit's argument: "if the state may, as a general matter, legit-
imately prohibit the granting of lethal medication, the fact that
these state[s] permit practices that are in the respondents' view
medically, ethically, and morally indistinguishable from lethal
medication requires that these states also do that.""2
Dellinger said that the United States disagreed with that view
and, like Vacco, believed a common-sense distinction could be
drawn between the two groups. "The historic distinction be-
tween killing someone and letting them die is so powerful that
we believe that it fully suffices here."'
308. Excerpts, supra note 277, at A16.
309. See id.
310. Id.
311. See id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
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Justice Ginsburg asked the Solicitor General if he could deal
with what she termed the "winks and nods" argument, that the
issue was a great sham because doctors had historically provid-
ed suicide assistance for "anybody who is sophisticated enough
to want it."314 Dellinger denied that any evidentiary practice
existed to support this claim.3"5
When Harvard Law School Professor Laurence H. Tribe rose
to support the case for physician-assisted suicide, he immediate-
ly attacked as a "fantasy" the notion that "at the end you're
either in this closed class of people who luckily have a plug
that can be pulled, or you're in some other group."16 When
Justice Kennedy said there was a historic common law distinc-
tion, Tribe tried to pull the Justices into the real world. "None
of these patients is in a state of nature. They're in a hospital or
a hospice."317 The state certainly has a right to characterize
certain actions as suicide, but "the government's characteriza-
tions can't control the constitutional analysis."318
Tribe took what appears, on paper at least, to be a fairly
belligerent stance. The difference between patients on life-sup-
port and other terminally ill patients was a fantasy. He agreed
that the states could differ in how they wanted to deal with the
problem, that they could, in Justice Brandeis's words, be labora-
tories for experimentation." 9 But "these laboratories ... are
314. There is nothing new about the desire of terminally in patients to
end their suffering by hastening death. Developments in modern health
care have simply brought into the open a previously private practice that
society has long condoned. Until the early part of this century, patients
suffering from incurable conditions overwhelmingly died at home due to
the limitations of the health care system. Their deaths were frequently
eased by the ministrations of alcohol and opiates .... [This gentle quit-
ting of a life ravaged by terminal disease became dependent on the aid
of compassionate physicians. The evidence shows that, despite the stric-
tures of the criminal law, many physicians have long been willing to
provide such assistance ....
Brief Amicus Curiae for American Civil Liberties Union on its Behalf and on Those
of Other Groups, available in 1996 WL 711194 at *27-28 (citing Julia Pugliese, Note:
Don't Ask-Don't Tell: The Secret Practice of Physician-Assisted Suicide, 44 HASTINGS
L.J. 1290, 1297-99 (1993)).
315. See Excerpts, supra note 277, at A16.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,
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now operating largely with the lights out. They're operating
with the lights out because it's not just New York."32' The
reason was because they had combined two principles and in
doing so the whole logic of opposition to physician-assisted
suicide collapsed.
One principle provides that you can medicate to reduce pain,
even if you know it will hasten death-providing that death is
"not your real intent."32' The other principle is the right of a
patient to refuse treatment or have treatment terminated. The
result is over-medication allegedly to kill pain but that in re-
ality is designed to hasten death. This "terminal sedation," as
he called it, "is overwhelmingly documented everywhere in the
country, it's not some sneaky practice."
22
Tribe also gave what may have been the best definition of
the claimed liberty interest in response to a question from Jus-
tice Stevens.
[T]he liberty interest in this case is the liberty, when facing
imminent and inevitable death, not to be forced by the
government to endure a degree of pain and suffering that
one can relieve only by being completely unconscious. Not to
be forced into that choice, that the liberty is the freedom, at
this threshold at the end-of-life, not to be a creature of the
state but to have some voice in the question of how much
pain one is really going through.3"
C.
The Justices handed down their decisions in the two cases on
June 26, 1997, at the very end of the term. Their finding, that
the Constitution did not provide a right to physician-assisted
suicide, did not surprise anyone, although the fact that the
holding was unanimous raised a few eyebrows.3" The three
J., dissenting).
320. Transcript of Oral Arguments, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997) (No. 95-
1858), available in 1997 WL 13672, at *43-44.
321. Id. at *44.
322. Id. at *44.
323. Id. at *55-56.
324. In both cases, Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas joined the
Chief Justice's opinions for the Court; Justice Scalia's vote came as a surprise to no
one, since he had earlier publicly announced that he saw no constitutional "right to
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Justices in Cruzan, however, who would have found a stronger
liberty interest-Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun-
had left the bench, and the centrists who had taken their place
shared the view that the Court had to be careful in finding new
rights. As in Cruzan, Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the
Court's opinions.
In Washington v. Glucksberg,3" the Court rejected the
Ninth Circuit's claim that physician assisted suicide constituted
a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause. Chief Justice Rehnquist began, "as we do in all due-
process cases, by examining our Nation's history, legal tradi-
tions, and practices."32 The history and tradition yielded no
support that assistance in suicide has ever been considered a
personal right, and "for over 700 years, the Anglo-American
common-law tradition has punished or otherwise disapproved of
both suicide and assisting suicide.3 27 Although, in recent
years, there had been a trend away from the common law's
harsh sanctions, this reflected not an acceptance of suicide, but
rather a belief that the suicide's family should not be punished
for his wrongdoing. As for assisting suicide, the various states
have, in recent years, re-examined and generally reaffirmed the
ban.
But now, individuals die primarily in institutions such as
hospitals and nursing homes, arid "[p]ublic concern and demo-
cratic action are therefore sharply focused on how best to pro-
tect dignity and independence at the end of life, with the result
that there have been many significant changes in state laws
and the attitudes these laws reflect."3" Nonetheless, "[d]espite
changes in medical technology and notwithstanding an in-
creased emphasis on the importance of end-of-life decision mak-
ing, we have not retreated from this prohibition [on assisted
suicide]." " Having recited this historical antipathy toward
die." Justice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer joined in part; Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer each filed a
concurring opinion. The concurrences are treated infra, notes 363-407, following the
exposition of the majority opinions in both cases.
325. 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
326. Id. at 2263.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 2265-66.
329. Id. at 2267.
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assisted suicide, the Chief Justice turned to the constitutional
claims.
Chief Justice Rehnquist began by agreeing that "[the Due
Process Clause protects more than fair process, and the 'liberty'
it protects includes more than the absence of physical re-
straint.""'0 The Chief Justice listed a long line of cases in
which the Court had found fundamental rights and interests
but stated "we 'ha[ve] always been reluctant to expand the
concept of substantive due process because guideposts for re-
sponsible decision making in this unchartered area are scarce
and open-ended."' 31 The Court's established due process anal-
ysis involves determining whether the claimed liberty interest
is "'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition," 2
and whether there is a "'careful description" of the asserted
liberty interest.333
Did the asserted interest in assisted suicide have any place
in the Nation's traditions? The answer could only be in the
negative. "To hold for respondents, we would have to reverse
centuries of legal doctrine and practice, and strike down the
considered policy choice of almost every State."'
In the second part of the analysis, the need for "careful de-
scription," the Court also rejected the respondents' claim that
the liberty interest in assisted suicide was consistent with the
Court's long line of due process decisions enumerating rights
protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. Here, the Chief
Justice went to great pains to declare what the Court had said
and had not said in the two cases relied upon in the Ninth
Circuit, Casey and Cruzan.
In the latter case, the Court, indeed, held that a right existed
to terminate life-sustaining equipment, but it also upheld the
state's right to require clear and convincing evidence that this
was the patient's' wish, especially in the case of an incompetent.
In doing so, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted, the Court did not
deduce a right "from abstract concepts of personal autono-
330. Id. (citing Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)).
331. Id. (quoting Collins, 503 U.S. at 125).
332. Id. at 2268 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
333. Id. (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).
334. Id. at 2269 (citing Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22 (1922)).
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my." 335 Rather, there existed a long common law tradition
that treated forced medication as a battery as well as upheld a
person's right to refuse unwanted medical treatment. That was
the extent of the court's analysis with regard to Cruzan and it
"certainly gave no intimation that the right to refuse unwanted
medical treatment could be somehow transmuted into a right to
assistance in committing suicide."336
In Casey, the Court had concluded that "the essential holding
of Roe v. Wade should be retained and once again reaf-
firmed."337 The case dealt with abortion, but it did note that
many of the rights and liberties subsumed under due process
"'involv[e] the most intimate and personal choices a person may
make in a lifetime.' 338 The lower courts, however, had gone
too far and had read this phrase to mean far more than the
Court had intended. The Court had summed up rights it had
already found, and had not issued a formula for identifying new
rights. '"at many of the rights and liberties protected by the
Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does not war-
rant the sweeping conclusion that any and all important, inti-
mate, and personal decisions are so protected."339
Chief Justice Rehnquist then went into an extended analysis
of the state's interest in preventing suicide and found all of
them convincing-preservation of human life,' ° protecting the
integrity of the medical profession, 4' protecting vulnerable
groups such as the poor and the elderly, 42 and fear of a slip-
pery slope, that permitting assisted suicide will lead to volun-
tary and perhaps even involuntary euthanasia.3  In the
Court's opinion, all of these interests are legitimate, and
"Washington's ban on assisted suicide is at least reasonably
related to their promotion and protection."'
335. Id. at 2270.
336. Id.
337. Id (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992)).
338. Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851) (alteration in original).
339. Id. at 2271.
340. See id. at 2272-75.
341. See id. at 2273.
342. See id. at 2273-74.
343. See id. at 2274-75.
344. Id. at 2275.
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In conclusion, the Court reversed the en banc decision of the
court of appeals, but the Chief Justice noted that "[t]hroughout
the Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound
debate about the morality, legality, and practicality of physi-
cian-assisted suicide. Our holding permits this debate to contin-
ue, as it should in a democratic society."45 Despite the fact
that states had traditionally opposed assisted suicide, nothing
in the Court's opinion was intended to foreclose them from
changing their minds. The decision followed almost precisely
the prescription that Professor Sunstein had endorsed, an opin-
ion that did not constitutionalize a right to assisted suicide, did
not foreclose that as an option for the states, and did not si-
lence the democratic dialogue.346
D
In the companion case of Vacco v. Quill," Chief Justice
Rehnquist took less than seven pages to overturn the Second
Circuit, in part because he did not find it necessary to reiterate
his lengthy historical analysis from the Glucksberg opinion. He
began by noting that, facially, New York's ban on assisted sui-
cide and its statutes permitting patients to refuse life-sustain-
ing treatment do not "treat anyone differently than anyone else
or draw any distinctions between persons. Everyone, regardless
of physical condition, is entitled, if competent, to refuse un-
wanted lifesaving medical treatment; no one is permitted to
assist a suicide." 45 In general, according to the Chief Justice,
"laws that apply evenhandedly to all 'unquestionably comply'
with the Equal Protection Clause.3 49
The Second Circuit had based its opinion on the conclusion
that people who refused physician-assisted suicide stood in the
same position as those on life-sustaining equipment, and the
state, by allowing one group to hasten death yet denying this to
the other, thus violated the strictures of the Equal Protection
345. Id.
346. See Sunstein, supra note 265.
347. 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
348. Id. at 2297-98 (emphasis in original).
349. Id. at 2298 (citing New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587
(1979)).
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Clause. The Supreme Court, however, disagreed completely with
this analysis. 'Unlike the Court of Appeals, we think the dis-
tinction between assisting suicide and withdrawing life-sustain-
ing treatment, a distinction widely recognized and endorsed in
the medical profession and in our legal traditions, is both im-
portant and logical; it is certainly rational."5 0
The Court found legal justification in the "fundamental legal
principles of causation and intent."5' If a patient declines
treatment, he dies from the underlying cause; if he takes a
lethal dosage of a drug, he is killed by that action. As to the
purported claim that there is no difference between a doctor
honoring a patient's wishes to have treatment terminated and
giving a patient a lethal overdose, the Court found that, in the
former instance, the physician is respecting his patient's re-
quest and "cease[s] doing useless and futile or degrading things
to the patient when [the patient] no longer stands to benefit
from them."5 2 Even when a patient dies from "aggressive pal-
liative care," the intent of the doctor is to alleviate the pain,
not to kill the patient. However, the physician who assists a
suicide "must, necessarily and indubitably, intend primarily
that the patient be made dead."3"
The Chief Justice did not think this distinction a difficult
one, and, in fact, a number of state courts had clearly distin-
guished one from the other." Looking to the most famous of
the lower court assisted-suicide cases, that of Dr. Jack
Kevorkian, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the "Michigan
Supreme Court also rejected the argument that the distinction
'between acts that artificially sustain life and acts that artifi-
cially curtail life' is merely a 'distinction without constitutional
significance-a meaningless exercise in semantic gymnastics,'
insisting that 'the Cruzan majority disagreed and so do
we." 355 Similarly, state legislatures had no difficulty under-
350. Id. (citation omitted).
351. Id.
352. Id. (citing Assisted Suicide in the United States: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 368 (1996)
(testimony of Dr. Leon R. Kass) [hereinafter Hearing]).
353. Id. at 2299 (quoting Hearing, supra note 352, at 367).
354. See id. at 2299 n.8 (listing several supporting cases).
355. Id. at 2299 (citing People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 728 (Mich. 1994)).
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standing the difference and had written that distinction into
law.3 5
6
Contrary to claims of the petitioners, New York had not
written an irrational or idiosyncratic bias into its law; rather,
the legislature had deliberated prudently, held numerous hear-
ings and mandated studies. The legislature had carefully delin-
eated patients' rights while defining the interests of the state
and, in doing so, had reaffirmed what it saw as a clear line
between "letting die" and "killing." In this, the Court's ruling in
Cruzan had been misinterpreted below, since in that case the
majority had "recognized, at least implicitly, the distinction
between letting a patient die and making that patient die.357
Cruzan, the Chief Justice emphasized, "provides no support for
the notion that refusing life-sustaining medical treatment is
'nothing more nor less than suicide." 55
Since logic and practice supported New York's judgment that
a clear and important distinction existed between allowing a
patient to die and making that patient die, the state could treat
these two groups of patients differently without violating the
Constitution. In conclusion, the Chief Justice reiterated what he
saw as the important state interests-prohibiting intentional
killing; preserving life; protecting the role of physician as heal-
er; sheltering vulnerable people from abuse, prejudice, and
financial pressure to end their lives; and "avoiding a possible
slide towards euthanasia"-all discussed in Glucksburg.359
"These valid and important public interests easily satisfy the
constitutional requirement that a legislative classification bear
a rational relation to some legitimate end."6°
E
We turn now to the various concurring opinions which, in
many ways, are more interesting and nuanced than the
straightforward approach of the majority decisions. In reversing
the Ninth Circuit's finding of a liberty interest in Glucksberg,
356. See id. at 2300 n.9 (listing the relevant parts of forty-eight state codes as
well as that of the District of Columbia and some of the island territories).
357. Id. at 2301.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 2302.
360. Id.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist appealed to history to show that sui-
cide had always been disfavored, and that even after the states
repealed their laws criminalizing self-murder, they kept those
laws on the books prohibiting assistance in suicide. Neither
history nor contemporary developments had ever created a
liberty interest that demanded the state permit physician-as-
sisted suicide, and the Ninth Circuit had totally misread the
key cases of Casey and Cruzan in reaching its decision.36' In
Vacco, the majority had denied that the Equal Protection
Clause demanded that states treat terminally ill patients the
same as those on life-support systems; it emphatically rejected
the idea that allowing the latter to die was the same as helping
the former to their deaths."2 The only hope that advocates of
assisted suicide could draw from the majority opinions was that
the Court had not barred a state from permitting physician-as-
sisted suicide.
Justice David Souter wrote an eighteen page concurrence in
Glucksberg, in which he carefully explored the history of sub-
stantive due process, from its beginnings in the early days of
the Republic to its repudiation after its abuse by conservatives
attacking economic regulation." However, Justice Souter also
noted that substantive due process had been used to defend
individual liberties as well as property rights; here, he clearly
considered Justice John Marshall Harlan's dissent in Poe v.
Allman" the most important statement of the type of rights
subsumed within due process. Justice Souter found three ele-
ments of that opinion necessary to any analysis of Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interests. First, he noted Harlan's "respect
for the tradition of substantive due process review," and the
necessity for the courts to undertake that review." "For two
centuries American courts, and for much of that time this
Court, have thought it necessary to provide some degree of
review over the substantive content of legislation under consti-
tutional standards of textual breadth."366 Justice Harlan saw
361. See supra notes 171-223 and accompanying text.
362. See supra notes 253-59 and accompanying text.
363. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2275, 2277-81 (1997) (Souter,
J., concurring).
364. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
365. Glucksburg, 117 S. Ct. at 2280 (Souter, J., concurring).
366. Id.
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due process as far more than procedural correctness. "Were due
process merely a procedural safeguard it would fail to reach
those situations where the deprivation of life, liberty or proper-
ty was accomplished by legislation which by operating in the
future could, given the fairest possible procedure in application
to individuals, nevertheless destroy the enjoyment of all
three."367 Therefore, Justice Souter concluded, the very text of
the Due Process Clause imposes on the courts "nothing less
than an obligation to give substantive content to the words
'liberty' and 'due process of law.'""a
Justice Harlan's second point in Poe reminded the Court that
the purpose of such review "is not the identification of
extratextual absolutes but scrutiny of a legislative resolution
(perhaps unconscious) of clashing principles, each quite possibly
worthy in and of itself, but each to be weighed within the histo-
ry of our values as a people.""5 9 The courts weigh the
strengths of opposing claims and do not substitute their judg-
ment based on what Justices see as first premises. Thus, even
if the judges personally prefer one form of resolution over an-
other, they cannot substitute their judgment for that of the
legislature, unless that body has exceeded clear constitutional
parameters. This leads to Harlan's third point, the necessity to
pay attention to detail as an element no less essential than
understanding the positions of the competing sides or recogniz-
ing the extent of legislative judgment.
Justice Souter went into this extended buildup, I believe,
because he found the majority opinion devoid of compassion or
awareness of the claims of terminally ill patients. The majority
had said there was no historic basis for recognizing assisted
suicide as a liberty interest, and therefore no liberty interest
existed. Justice Souter understood that due process had been
used in the past to create or at least to recognize hitherto la-
tent rights. 7 ° While not ready to create a right to assisted
suicide, he wanted to acknowledge that even if the legislature
was well within its powers to make the choice it did, and even
367. Id. at 2281 (citing Poe, 367 U.S. at 541).
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. See id. at 2280-81 (listing examples of such rights).
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if judicial deference required the courts to respect that decision,
those seeking the right also had a claim that the courts needed
to hear even if they did not agree with it. Justice Souter also
implied that the majority had been far too rigid in its analysis,
and he quoted from both Justice Harlan and Justice Lewis
Powell that appropriate review of substantive due process
claims comes not from drawing arbitrary lines, but from under-
standing the historic bases of those claims as well as the recog-
nition of shared social values.
3 71
Courts, according to Justice Souter, had "to assess the rela-
tive 'weights' or dignities of the contending interests, and to
this extent the judicial method is familiar to the common
law."372 In doing so, however, courts had to be careful to con-
fine any liberty interests they recognized to those that truly de-
served constitutional stature, those "so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamen-
tal."373 Courts also had to remember that their business in-
volved constitutional review, not judicial lawmaking. Thus,
judges had to review the competing claims carefully and with
great attention to detail, but they had no right to substitute
their preferences for those of the legislative branch. Justice
Harlan had set clear standards for courts to follow in due pro-
cess review, a path that, on the one hand, avoids the arbi-
trariness of absolutes and, on the other, stands firm against
making simple reasonableness a standard for declaring rights.
With these standards in mind, Justice Souter turned to the
question before the Court. Unlike the majority, Justice Souter
framed the question in very limited terms. "[Hiere we are faced
with an individual claim not to a right on the part of just any-
one to help anyone else commit suicide under any circumstanc-
es, but to the right of a narrow class to help others also in a
narrow class under a set of limited circumstances."374 To this
claim the state responded "that rights of such narrow scope
371. See id. at 2282 (citing Justice Harlan in Poe, 367 U.S. at 542, and Justice
Powell in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
372. Id. at 2283.
373. Id. (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
374. Id. at 2286.
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cannot be recognized without jeopardy to individuals whom the
State may concededly protect through its regulations."a5
Justice Souter's analysis of the patient and doctor claim
showed far greater sensitivity to nuance than did the majority
opinion. The respondents did not base their claim on history
but, in fact, acknowledged that, historically, there had been
prohibitions. The lesson of history was not that suicide had at
one time been considered a criminal act, but rather that it had
long since been decriminalized. Justice Souter, however, refused
to follow the respondents' argument that this opened the door
to requiring the decriminalization of assisting in suicide. The
reasons for decriminalization may have had far more to do with
the practical ability of the state to prevent such acts than any
change in popular moral views. "Thus it may indeed make
sense for the State to take its hands off suicide as such, while
continuing to prohibit the sort of assistance that would make
its commission easier."3 76 Decriminalization, by itself, did not
imply the existence of any constitutional right orliberty inter-
est.
Both the Ninth Circuit and the respondents had made much
of the Court's analysis of bodily autonomy in Casey, and Justice
Souter acknowledged that analogies existed between the abor-
tion cases and those dealing with assisted suicide-most impor-
tantly, the need for a doctor in both instances. Without a
doctor's assistance in abortion, "the woman's right would have
too often amounted to nothing more than a right to self-mutila-
tion, and without a physician to assist in the suicide of the
dying, the patient's right will often be confined to crude meth-
ods of causing death, most shocking and painful to the
decedent's survivors."3"
Justice Souter also agreed that one could make a strong case
that physician-assisted suicide fell within "the accepted tradi-
tion of medical care in our society."3 78 In the abortion cases,
the Court recognized the need for a doctor, and not just to
perform the medical procedure. The Court "recognized that the
375. Id.
376. Id. at 2287.
377. Id. at 2288.
378. Id.
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good physician is not just a mechanic of the human body whose
services have no bearing on a person's moral choices, but one
who does more than treat symptoms, one who ministers to the
patient."379 The idea of the physician treating the whole per-
son is just as important in end-of-life decisions as in abortion.
The patients in this case wanted not only to end their pain
(which Justice Souter noted they might have done, although
only at the price of stupor), "but an end to their short remain-
ing lives with a dignity that they believed would be denied
them by powerful pain medication, as well as by their con-
sciousness of dependency and helplessness as they approached
death."380 One could hardly imagine any other circumstances
in which the call for bodily autonomy carried greater weight,
and in which the role of the physician, including assistance, fell
within the "traditional norm" of health care. 81 In fact, the
state had already recognized this right in its willingness to
allow terminally ill patients to stop treatment and to withdraw
life-sustaining medication, thus hastening death. It even al-
lowed physicians to administer powerful pain-killing medication
in this terminal condition, even if such dosages bring on death.
Up until this point, one might have thought Justice Souter
was preparing a dissent rather than a concurrence. He summed
up the respondents' arguments as going through "three steps of
increasing forcefulness."382 First, that there is a decriminaliza-
tion of suicide; second, that decriminalization provides freedom
of choices analogous to individual options in recognized areas of
bodily autonomy, such as abortion; and third, that the claim for
assistance is not based on some broad principle, but rather on
the traditional role of doctors in ministering to all the medical
needs of their patients." s This was a powerful argument, Jus-
tice Souter noted, one demanding, under the Poe criteria, "care-
ful scrutiny of the State's contrary claim." 4
379. Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965)).
380. Id. at 2289.
381. See id.
382. Id.
383. See id. at 2289-90.
384. Id. at 2290.
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Justice Souter then proceeded to do just that. The State had
essentially put forward three interests to justify its
law-protecting life generally, discouraging suicide (even if
knowing and voluntary), and protecting terminally ill patients
from involuntary euthanasia. Justice Souter found it unneces-
sary to discuss the first two, since the third argument proved
dispositive for him. The State had argued that a very slippery
slope existed, and that it would be all too easy, perhaps inevita-
ble, to progress down that slope.
[M]istaken decisions may result from inadequate palliative
care or a terminal prognosis that turns out to be error;
coercion and abuse may stem from the large medical bills
that family members cannot bear or unreimbursed hospitals
decline to shoulder. Voluntary and involuntary euthanasia
may result once doctors are authorized to prescribe lethal
medication in the first instance, for they might find it
pointless to distinguish between patients who administer
their own fatal drugs and those who wish not to, and their
compassion for those who suffer may obscure the distinction
between those who ask for death and those who may be
unable to request it."
In Justice Souter's opinion can be found what is so absent
from Chief Justice Rehnquist's, i.e., not only the suffering of the
individual patient, but also the concerns of a compassionate
state. The Chief Justice had found the state interests rational
and the history opposed to assisted suicide, and there is barely
a hint of the individual, patient or doctor, who must live within
this system with no recourse. Justice Souter seemed to imply
that should conditions change, the Court might also reconsider.
The example of the Netherlands, where fairly strict regulation
exists, had been invoked by both sides, the respondents to sup-
port their claim that strong rules would prevent abuse, the
state to prove that euthanasia had gotten out of control.3"
Justice Souter took the middle route, and the one supported by
the bulk of the evidence; namely, that "a substantial dispute"
existed about what the Dutch experience meant.387 While that
dispute might someday be resolved, until it is, there exists
385. Id.
386. See id. at 2292.
387. Id.
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enough evidence to support the state's concern about legitimiz-
ing assisted suicide. 'The day may come when we can say with
some assurance which side is right [in what the Dutch practice
means], but for now it is the substantiality of the factual dis-
agreement, and the alternatives for resolving it, that matter.
They are, for me, dispositive of the due process claim at this
time."'
Given this dispute, Justice Souter would defer to the legisla-
tive judgment, but added that there was still much learning to
be done on the subject. For the moment, the legislature is as
well suited as the judiciary to undertake that examination.
Moreover, in declaring constitutional rights courts ought to act
with finality and cannot experiment with what might or might
not be done under differing circumstances."'
Legislatures, however, are not so constrained. The experi-
mentation that should be out of the question in constitu-
tional adjudication displacing legislative judgment is en-
tirely proper, as well as highly desirable, when the legisla-
tive power addresses an emerging issue like assisted sui-
cide.... While I do not decide for all time that respondents'
claim should not be recognized, I acknowledge the legisla-
tive institutional competence as the better one to deal with
that claim at this time.39
Justice Souter's opinion, I suggest, is a far better opinion
than that of the majority. The latter is rigid and formalistic,
with barely a hint of the great emotional issues involved, the
pain and suffering of individuals and their families, the moral
dilemmas of doctors, and the effect on society. Justice Souter is
cognizant of these matters, and if he cannot give those in pain
the answer they want, he at least acknowledges that they have
a legitimate claim, that mere recourse to history is an evasion
rather than an answer. He also clearly leaves the door open for
the Court to revisit this matter, even as he urges the states to
grapple with it further.
388. Id. at 2292 (emphasis added).
389. See id. at 2293.
390. Id. (emphasis added).
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F
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the only Justice to file a con-
currence who also signed onto the Court's opinion, wrote an
opinion that also implied that, given another set of factual
circumstances and claims, she too would be willing to reconsid-
er the decision. In Justice O'Connor's opinion, the majority had
framed the issue fairly narrowly; namely, whether the Due
Process Clause protects a right to commit suicide which in-
cludes the right to have assistance in doing so. She then con-
cluded that the Nation's history and legal traditions did not
support such a right. She agreed "that there is no generalized
right to 'commit suicide.'"3 9' Justice O'Connor recognized, how-
ever, that respondents had asked the Court to address a nar-
rower question: whether a mentally competent person experi-
encing great pain and suffering has a constitutionally protected
right to control the circumstances of his or her imminent
death?392
This claim need not be reached in either case, Justice
O'Connor noted, because such people could already get the
relief they sought. "The parties and amici agree that in these
States a patient who is suffering from a terminal illness and
who is experiencing great pain has no legal barriers to obtain-
ing medication, from qualified physicians, to alleviate that suf-
fering, even to the point of causing unconsciousness and hasten-
ing death."3 9 Given this fact, she saw no reason why the
state should not be allowed to pursue its legitimate interests in
protecting those who are not competent or whose decisions
might not be truly voluntary.
What Justice O'Connor left unsaid was what she would do
were the states to change that situation. What might happen
should the states, in their efforts to protect those needing pro-
tection, impinge upon the ability of the competent to gain this
relief? She urged the states to continue in their "extensive and
serious evaluation of physician-assisted suicide and other relat-
391. Id. at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
392. See id.
393. Id.
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ed issues," adding, on a highly unusual personal note, that
"[elvery one of us at some point may be affected by our own or
a family member's terminal illness."3
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg noted briefly that she concurred
in the judgments in the two cases, "substantially for the rea-
sons stated by Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion.3 95
Justice Stephen Breyer also joined in Justice O'Connor's concur-
rence, but not insofar as it joined in the majority reasoning.
Justice Breyer went on to explain that, in Vacco, he agreed
that the state interests justified differentiating between physi-
dan-assisted suicide and withdrawal of life-support, and he also
agreed with the majority that the critical question was whether
a liberty interest existed under the Fourteenth Amendment to
support the respondents' claim.396 He differed with the Court,
however, on how it formulated that right; namely, a right to
commit suicide with another's assistance.397 Justice Breyer
said he would not reject the claim without considering a differ-
ent formulation that might have greater support within the
American legal tradition. "That formulation would use words
roughly like a 'right to die with dignity.' But irrespective of the
exact words used, at its core would lie personal control over the
manner of death, professional medical assistance, and the
avoidance of unnecessary and severe physical suffer-
ing-combined."
398
Justice Breyer referred to Justice Souter's due process analy-
sis and agreed "that this Court need or now should decide
whether or not such a right [to die with dignity] is 'fundamen-
tal."3 99 He reasoned that the avoidance of severe physical pain
would be essential to such a claim, and as Justice O'Connor
had pointed out, the laws of both New York and Washington
did not force a dying person to undergo that pain. Doctors could
prescribe palliative medication, even to the point of hastening
death. Thus, state law did not infringe upon a central interest
the way that anti-contraceptive laws had done in Poe or
394. Id.
395. Id. at 2310 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
396. See id. at 2311 (Breyer, J., concurring).
397. See id.
398. Id.
399. Id.
1998] 397
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:313
Griswold. However,
[w]ere the legal circumstances different-for example, were
state laws to prevent the provision of palliative care, includ-
ing the administration of drugs as needed to avoid pain at
the end-of-life-then the law's impact upon serious and
otherwise unavoidable physical pain (accompanying death)
would be more directly at issue. And as Justice O'Connor
suggests, the Court might have to revisit its conclusions in
these cases.' °
The lone member of the Cruzan minority still sitting on the
Court, Justice John Paul Stevens, also concurred in the judg-
ment. The majority noted that its holding remained consistent
with the ongoing debate over the morality, legality, and practi-
cality of physician-assisted suicide. Justice Stevens wrote sepa-
rately "to make it clear that there is also room for further de-
bate about the limits that the Constitution places on the power
of the States to punish the practice."40'
The respondents had filed a facial challenge to the laws, and,
while the Court has not always been clear on what criteria are
to be used in evaluating a facial challenge, plaintiffs generally
have to show a broader violation of constitutional rights than
they would in an "as applied" challenge, such as where a
statute's constitutionality is challenged as applied to a partic-
ular plaintiff or group of plaintiffs. Facial challenges are the
most difficult, "since the challenger must establish that no set
of circumstances exists under which the Act would be val-
id."" 2 Referring to the Court's previous decisions in capital
punishment cases, Justice Stevens noted that
just as our conclusion that capital punishment is not always
unconstitutional did not preclude later decisions holding
that it is sometimes impermissibly cruel, so is it equally
clear that a decision upholding a general statutory prohibi-
tion of assisted suicide does not mean that every possible
application of the statute would be valid. A State, like
Washington, that has authorized the death penalty and
thereby has concluded that the sanctity of human life does
400. Id. at 2312.
401. Id. at 2304 (Stevens, J., concurring).
402. Id. (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987)).
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not require that it always be preserved, must acknowledge
that there are situations in which an interest in hastening
death is legitimate. Indeed, not only is that interest some-
times legitimate, I am also convinced that there are times
when it is entitled to constitutional protection."3
Justice Stevens referred to Cruzan, which was used by both
circuit courts to justify their decisions, and which the majority
claimed had been misinterpreted. The majority in that case had
agreed that a liberty interest existed, but that it might be out-
weighed by relevant state interests. Justice Stevens agreed, but
he believed that Nancy Cruzan's right went beyond a common
law rule.
Rather, this right is an aspect of a far broader and more
basic concept of freedom that is even older than the com-
mon law. This freedom embraces, not merely a person's
right to refuse a particular kind of unwanted treatment, but
also her interest in dignity, and in determining the charac-
ter of the memories that will survive long after her
death.'
The majority in Cruzan, he believed, recognized that right at
least implicitly.
Cruzan also means that some state intrusions on how indi-
viduals choose to encounter death will not be tolerated. The
original patients in these two cases, now dead, "may in fact
have had a liberty interest even stronger than Nancy Cruzan's
because, not only were they terminally ill, they were suffering
constant and severe pain."4 °5 While Justice Stevens agreed
that there is no absolute right to physician-assisted suicide, he
believed that Cruzan meant that people who no longer had a
choice in whether to live or die, who were already at death's
door, had "a constitutionally protected interest that may out-
weigh the State's interest in preserving life at all costs.""'
Justice Stevens believed that, in such situations, the liberty
interest was different from, and far stronger than, the common
403. Id. at 2305 (emphasis added).
404. Id. at 2306.
405. Id. at 2307.
406. Id.
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law rule and also trumped any state interest. "It is an interest
in deciding how, rather than whether, a critical threshold shall
be crossed. 40 7
Justice Stevens concurred in the New York case because he
believed a difference existed between letting someone die and
hastening that person's death. He concurred in the Washington
case because he did not think a broad liberty interest existed.
But he, like Justices Souter, O'Connor, Ginsberg and Breyer,
did not believe that the issue was definitively resolved. Justices
Stevens, like the other Justices, also encouraged the states to
experiment and explore the issue further, but there is no ques-
tion that he, too, wanted to keep the door to the Court ajar.
VI
What is one to make of this plethora of opinions? First, it is
clear that considerations other than constitutional interpreta-
tion were involved. The Court's decision in Cruzan elicited little
negative comment, since most Americans believe that people on
life-support should have the choice of refusing treatment, and a
long line of common law cases confirmed the legal rationale for
supporting that choice. Moreover, medical and religious groups
do not equate the cessation of treatment with suicide, on the
grounds that the illness or condition is the actual cause of
death."° Nevertheless, popular attitudes toward suicide are
quite diverse; there is no consensus on whether people have a
"right" to kill themselves, much less on whether others should
be permitted to help them. While doctors covertly provide pre-
scriptions for lethal doses of medication, the medical profession
as a whole is on record as opposed to legalizing physician-as-
sisted suicide. I would suggest that in these cases, the Court
did not want to get out ahead of public opinion and call down
upon itself the same firestorm of criticism that had greeted its
decision in Roe v. Wade.4 9 The Court wisely has allowed the
debate to continue, but has left itself the option, if needed, of
407. Id.
408. The Catholic Church, for example, is unalterably opposed to euthanasia, and
in a papal document had lumped euthanasia with murder, genocide and abortion. The
Vatican, however, has absolved Catholic physicians from any obligation to use heroic
measures on terminally ill patients, and Catholics are permitted to refuse treatment.
See GERALD A. LARUE, EUTHANASiA AND RELIGION 35-43 (1985).
409. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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revisiting the issue. From the viewpoint of judicial politics, the
Court reached the "right" decision in both cases.
What about the issues in these cases? Has the Court provid-
ed any guidance other than allowing the states great leeway in
what they choose to do? The Chief Justice's opinions in the two
cases are extremely formalistic, and, while paying lip service to
the fact that end-of-life decisions may be emotionally distress-
ing, there is very little humanity in the analysis. In essence,
the majority utilized a test for determining liberty interests
that is simple and simplistic: is there a historic basis for such
an interest? If yes, then we are willing to grant it some level of
constitutional recognition. If no, then there is no right, and the
states are free to ignore the claim.
While attractive in that such a test provides a relatively
straightforward analytic scheme, it also ignores the fact that
the world in which we live is not the world of 1789, nor that of
1868. We inhabit a world of automobiles, airplanes, telephones,
computers and medical sophistication undreamed of at the time
the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment were adopt-
ed.410 To insist on interpreting the Due Process Clause as if
nothing has happened in the last 130 years is to put the Con-
stitution into a straightjacket.' As Judge Reinhardt noted in
his opinion for the Ninth Circuit,4"2 were history the sole
guide for interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court
could never have overturned the anti-miscegenation statutes.
Over the Court's long history, its majority opinions have
often been overshadowed and even replaced by concurring or
dissenting opinions. In the assisted-suicide cases, Justice
Souter's concurrence may well become the opinion that lower
410. For example, in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, nearly everyone died
at home; today approximately 80% of people die in hospitals. According to Dr. Susan
W. Tolle, director of the Center for Ethics in Health Care at the Oregon Health Sci-
ences University in Portland, "generally, if you get to a hospital alive, we can extend
that life." Egan, supra note 111, at Al. The problem, as she acknowledges, is not all
people want their lives extended. Oregon's Measure 16, she says, is not so much
about suicide as about patients' desire for more control over their end-of-life choices.
See id.
411. See Todd David Robichaud, Toward A More Perfect Union: A Federal Cause of
Action for Physician Aid-in-Dying, 27 U. MIcH. J. L. REFORM, 521, 529 (1994).
412. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 805 (9th Cir. 1996),
reu'd, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
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courts look to in the future. His elucidation of Justice Harlan's
dissent in Poe v. Ullman413 is not only a more persuasive ar-
gument for how one determines when a liberty interest is impli-
cated, but is also a far better constitutional analysis. Justice
Souter recognized, as did the other Justices who refused to sign
on to Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinions, that end-of-life issues
will become increasingly important in American society. Merely
stating that they were not an issue in 1868 will neither serve
as a guide to lower courts nor provide much comfort to Ameri-
cans who will have to wrestle with these issues on a personal
basis.
The critical issue is to what extent we, as a society, are will-
ing to grant individual autonomy to people who will then use
that autonomy to make decisions with which a majority may
not agree. American democracy has been unique in that it has
relied not only on faith in the people as a whole to govern
themselves, but also in the great latitude it has given individu-
als to choose how to lead their own lives. There are some critics
who believe that we have allowed this individualistic strain to
grow too large, overbalancing the needed sense of community
that keeps society in balance. Surely, however, the lower courts
were right in their view that end-of-life choices, just like abor-
tion, involve "the most intimate and personal choices a person
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, [and] are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. 414
Moreover, the reasoning of both courts and various medical
groups regarding the distinction between terminating life-sup-
port and taking an overdose of lethal medication strikes me as
spurious. The conscious, competent person who turns off a ven-
tilator or who stops going to dialysis sessions knows what the
result will be, as does the conscious, competent person who
washes down 100 Seconal pills with vodka. If the second person
is suffering from a painful and incurable illness, but is not on
life-support, why shouldn't she have the same option as the
first person, to end a life which has lost meaning and contains
nothing but pain and suffering? This was the lesson Lawrence
413. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
414. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
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-Tribe tried to teach the Justices; namely, that in the real world
people who are suffering, but not on life-support, are still suf-
fering. Why should they be treated differently from those on
life-support who have the choice of ending their misery?
One of the more disturbing features of the Court's decision is
that the Justices seem aware of the fact that every day doctors
help patients die, and that they are willing to allow this prac-
tice to continue in a form of gray market. Mark Graber, in his
book on abortion, describes a gray market as a quasi-legal ar-
rangement whereby governmental authorities acquiesce and
sometimes even aid in the distribution of goods or services that
nominally are supposed to be forbidden to all."' Under the
guise of "pain relief," authorities will allow a doctor to prescribe
barbiturates in lethal doses under the fiction that all the physi-
cian is trying to do is ease the suffering, and, should death
occur, it would be an unintended by-product.416 The result of
continuing this practice will be that middle and upper-middle
class people who have access to the health care system and
comprehend how it works will be able to exercise individual
autonomy in their end-of-life choices. Others without such ac-
cess and knowledge will have no control over their deaths.
What about the moral arguments? What about people who
believe that suicide, even for those who are terminally ill and
suffering, is an affront to God? Those people have every right
not to commit suicide, just as women who do not believe in
abortion have every right not to have one. In fact, the case here
is even stronger than in the abortion debate. Opponents of
abortion say they are defending the life and the rights of the
unborn who are powerless to protect themselves. End-of-life
decisions, however, involve no innocent, mute and powerless
third parties, just the man or woman who wants to end his or
her torment. As for doctors who do not want to participate in
415. See generally MARK A. GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION: EQUAL CHOICE, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND REPRODUCTIVE POLITICS (1996).
416. Washington State "generally permits physicians to administer medication to
patients in terminal conditions when the primary intent is to alleviate pain, even
when the medication is so powerful as to hasten death and the patient chooses to
receive it with that understanding." Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2289
(1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (citing to WASH. REV. CODE § 70.122.010 (1994); and
referring to several journal articles confirming that statement).
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such a practice, they also have a choice. No one is forcing them
to prescribe lethal overdoses, just as no doctors are forced to
perform an abortion against their will.
A stronger argument deals with protecting the vulnera-
ble-the poor, the elderly, the less than fully competent-who
may be under pressure from their family to end it all and to
stop being a financial and emotional burden on their loved
ones. This is a legitimate interest of the state, and no one in
favor of assisted suicide believes it should be anything other
than a voluntary choice, free from undue pressure. There is a
slippery slope out there that could lead, as one of my students
put it, to a "drive-through McDeath." It does not follow, howev-
er, that stringent and effective means cannot be put into place
to ensure that the option of physician-assisted suicide is not
abused and misused.417 The law, as Ronald Dworkin has ar-
gued, must protect people "who think it would be appalling to
be killed, even if they had only painful minutes to live. But the
law must also protect those with the opposite conviction: that it
would be appalling not to be offered an easier, calmer death
with the help of doctors they trust."
41 s
Nor should one ignore the fact that end-of-life treatment for
many people is terribly bad, often little more than a warehous-
ing of the sick and infirm until they die. One reason that juries
have refused to convict Jack Kevorkian is that many jurors see
his "mercy machine" as the only available option to weeks or
months of suffering under horrible conditions. Opponents of
assisted suicide recognize this problem and are calling for
better treatment of the terminally ill rather than what they see
as the easy fix of euthanasia. 19 In an ideal world, there
would be a range of options that would include good hospital
treatment for the terminally ill, effective pain management,
hospice care, as well as physician-assisted suicide. The debate
417. On this matter, I disagree strongly with Professor Robert A. Burt of Yale
Law School, who believes that the United States is too diverse and large to ever put
effective safeguards in place. That might be true if this became a national policy, but
I see no reason why such safeguards cannot be successfully created in the states. See
Robert A. Burt, Death Made Too Easy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1994, at A19.
418. Ronald Dworkin, When Is It Right to Die?, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1994, at A19.
419. See e.g., Herbert Hendin, Scared to Death of Dying, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,
1994, at A39.
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should not be allowed to become one of all or nothing, suicide
or suffering.
For the time being, the Court, despite the unconvincing opin-
ion of the Chief Justice, has done the right thing. One needs to
keep in mind that the whole question of the right to die is a
relatively new one, and that of assisted suicide even newer.
There is a national debate going on, and it should be allowed to
continue uninterrupted. The closeness of the initiative votes in
Washington and California, as well as the passage of Measure
16 in Oregon, indicate that a large number of Americans want
to have the option of controlling their own end-of-life choices.
Attention will now be focused on the Oregon experience, to see
if a program can be effective in giving some people the choice
they want without it being abused by others.42 Many years
ago, Justice Brandeis wrote that "[i]t is one of the happy inci-
dents of the federal system that a single courageous state may,
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the coun-
try.421 That experiment is about to begin, and one cannot pre-
dict how it will proceed. However, one does not have to be a
prophet to know that the issue of assisted suicide will not go
away, and that it will, at some time, return through the door
that the Supreme Court has left ajar.
420. As this issue went to press, the first known legal suicide under Oregon's
Death with Dignity Law took place. An unidentified woman in her mid-80s, suffering
from terminal breast cancer, took a lethal dose of barbiturates washed down by a
glass of brandy. The announcement of the woman's death was made by Compassion
in Dying, the lead plaintiff in the Washington case; state officials, citing the privacy
provisions of the law, would not confirm the case. Timothy Egan, First Death Under
an Assisted-Suicide Law, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1998, at Al.
421. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting).
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